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PREFACE 
I have been involved in policing and crime prevention for many years.  I was a 
sworn member of Victoria Police (Australia), a crime prevention coordinator in a 
New Zealand community, and am currently employed by New Zealand Police 
(NZP).  My interest in international policing grew as I realised more and more 
police were serving in a number of roles overseas.  At first, I thought this a nice 
departure from normal duties for those lucky enough to take up opportunities to 
contribute to policing in other countries.  Deeper thought followed about the 
juxtaposition of western models of policing, international relations and the 
customs of developing countries.  The more I tried to find out the more 
questions were raised.  Soon it was evident that little had been written about 
international policing and even less about international policing in relation to the 
Pacific.  The need for research that combines the study of cross-border policing 
of crime and criminality with international relations scholarship has been 
identified by Peter Andreas and Ethan Nadelmann in their 2006 co-authored 
book.1  A growing body of literature2 examines policing and development in the 
Pacific, but is mainly centred on conflicts in Melanesia with particular emphasis 
on the Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI).  Apparently, no 
single work discusses the needs of police services in the Pacific in relation to 
domestic policing and international cooperation.  This work seeks to fill that gap. 
                                         
1
 Peter Andreas and Ethan Nadelmann, Policing the Globe: Criminalisation and Crime Control in 
International Relations (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006). This text provides a comparative 
study of international policing in the UK and US and as such does not discuss the Pacific region. 
2
 M. Anne Brown, "Security and Development: Conflict and Resilience in the Pacific Islands Region," 
in Security and Development in the Pacific Islands, ed. M Anne Brown (Boulder, London: Lynne 
Rienner Publishers Inc, 2007), 1-32.; Andrew Goldsmith and J.W.E. Sheptycki, "Introduction," in 
Crafting Transnational Policing: Police Capacity-Building and Global Policing Reform, ed. Andrew 
Goldsmith and James Sheptycki, Onati International Series in Law and Society (Oxford, Portland: 
Hart Publishing, 2007), 1-28.; Abby McLeod, "Police Reform in Papua New Guinea," in Security and 
Development in the Pacific Islands: Social Resilience in Emerging States, ed. M Anne Brown (Boulder, 
London: Lynne Rienner Publishers Inc, 2007), 73-88.; Abby McLeod and Sinclair Dinnen, "Police 
Building in the Southwest Pacific - New Directions in Australian Regional Building," in Crafting 
International Policing: Police Capacity-Building and Global Policing Reform, ed. Andrew Goldsmith 
and James Sheptycki, Onati International Series in Law and Society (Oxford, Portland: Hart 
Publishing, 2007), 295-328.; Abby McLeod and Juani O'Reilly, "Pacific Policing," in The SAGE 
Dictionary of POLICING, ed. Alison Wakefield and Jenny Fleming (London, Thousand Oaks, New 
Dehli, Singapore: SAGE Publications Ltd, 2009), 213-215.; James Sheptycki, "Introduction," in 
Issues in Transnational Policing, ed. J.W.E. Sheptycki (London, New York: Routledge, 2000), 1-20. 
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KEY TERMS AND CONCEPTS 
Metropolitan State 
The term metropolitan state is used quite extensively throughout this thesis and 
means the countries that built empires through colonising smaller countries and 
nations across the globe over the centuries.  In relation to the Pacific and 
particularly this thesis, the metropolitan states are Australia, New Zealand, 
France, the United Kingdom, the United States of America, Chile, and the 
Netherlands (Holland).  All of these countries were or are still colonisers and 
have an impact on the developing countries of the Pacific Islands.  
Rule of Law 
“The Rule of Law, in it most basic form, is the principle that no one is above the 
law.  The rule follows logically from the idea that truth, and therefore law, is 
based upon fundamental principles which can be discovered, but which cannot 
be created through an act of will. 
The most important application of the rule of law is the principle that 
governmental authority is legitimately exercised only in accordance with 
established procedural steps that are referred to as due process.  The principle is 
intended to be a safeguard against arbitrary governance, whether by a 
totalitarian leader or by mob rule.  Thus, the rule of law is hostile both to 
dictatorship and to anarchy.”3 
Sovereignty 
„Highly contested term - the highest law-making authority; or, the most effective 
law enforcement power.  The recognition of an international frontier establishes 
two separate but interdependent notions of order.   There is an internal order, 
which rests on the state and its relationship with its people, and there is an 
external order that is managed (or created) by the relations amongst states.‟4 
                                         
3
 "Rule of Law," LexisNexis, http://www.lexisnexis.co.nz/about-us/rule-of-law/default.aspx (accessed 
3 March, 2009). 
4
 Richard Herr, "The Concept of the 'Failed State': A Brobdingnagian View from Lilliput," in New 
Zealand in a Globalising World, ed. Ralph Pettman (Wellington: Victoria University Press, 2005), 99-
109. 
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The Pacific Way 
The term was coined by Fiji‟s then Prime Minister, Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara5 in 
1972 as a way of explaining to ex-colonial rulers, and new partners in the South 
Pacific Forum how Pacific peoples went about doing things.  Mara was keen to 
shy away from what is often seen as confrontational and contradictory Western 
political discourse and stressed dialogue, consensus and mutual understanding 
as three key factors of collective engagement in creating a common Pacific 
regional identity. 6   These three key factors are further underpinned by 
moderation, respect, inclusiveness, negotiation, adaptation and compromise, 7 all 
of which are necessary in facilitating the journey of regional and global 
development and growth.  This said, there is criticism of Mara‟s Pacific Way by 
some who see it as an excuse to slow progress and stifle freedom of expression.8 
 
 
 
                                         
5
 Steven Ratuva, "Mara's 'Pacific Way' Legacy: Remembering The Pacific's Dominant Leader," Pacific 
Magazine, 1 June 2004. 
6
 Ibid. 
7
 Elise Huffer, "Regionalism and Cultural Identity: Putting the Pacific back into the plan," in 
Globalisation and Governance in the Pacific Islands, ed. Stewart Firth (Canberra: Australian National 
University (ANU) E Press, 2006). 
8
 Ratuva, "Mara's 'Pacific Way' Legacy: Remembering The Pacific's Dominant Leader." Confidential 
interview, Respondent A:05, Apia, 2008. Confidential interview, Respondent B:01, Wellington 2008. 
Confidential interview, Respondent B:02, Wellington 2008.  Confidential interview, Respondent B:03, 
Wellington 2008.  Confidential interview, B:04, Wellington 2008. 
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CHAPTER ONE: Introduction 
The main objective of this thesis is to enhance our understanding of the 
phenomenon of international policing and the unique internal and external 
pressures on policing jurisdictions within the Pacific Region.  Pressures arise from 
a complex of situational factors including: the isolated nature of the region; 
varying levels of development in its small island states; histories of colonisation 
and decolonisation and self-determination; United Nations Declarations on 
human rights; unprecedented amounts of donor funding; neighbouring states‟ 
national security concerns and increasing transnational organised crime.  Such 
pressures are pitted against low populations, an area that contains twenty 
percent of the world‟s cultures and languages but only one percent of the 
population, 9  a lack of technology and other resources, fiscally dependent 
economies, internal conflicts, emerging understandings of globalisation, 
regionalisation and internationalisation, and policing methods that are 
considered naïve by advanced western countries.  Policing these complexities 
requires a deep understanding of the individual countries and cultures of the 
Pacific, their laws, and of policing.  
Most countries in the Pacific carry the burden of colonial structures of 
governance that are expensive to maintain and follow western models that bear 
little, if any, resemblance to Pacific Islands‟ customary ways of living.  For the 
strong familial cultures of the Pacific they are difficult to understand and seem 
odd and alien.  On the other hand, more recently colonial standards have raised 
awareness of the rights of humans to be free from hunger, fear and pain and to 
be treated fairly and without violence.  But, Westerners must understand the 
realities of life in developing small island countries, particularly those in the 
Pacific.  Populations are small and scattered over thousands of islands.  There is 
often only one urban centre where large percentages of populations have 
domiciled to take up or seek work.  There is a huge difference in the way people 
live in urban centres compared to rural or outlying islands.  There is an even 
bigger difference between the way urbanised Pacific Island peoples live and the 
way urbanised westerners live.  Many outlying islands and villages do not have 
police at all, or access to clean fresh water, medical services or education.  It 
                                         
9
 K.R. Howe, "The Last Frontier," in VAKA MOANA: Voyages of the Ancestors, ed. K.R. Howe 
(Auckland: David Bateman Ltd, 2006), 14-21. 
  
2 
can take days on foot to get to the nearest medical centre or police post to 
report a medical or criminal event.  Often, there are no telephones, roads or 
cars.  People deal with emergencies or life‟s events the way they always have; 
mothers and babies die because of isolation from medical care and these deaths 
are not reported because of distance and effort, 10  and crime, for the same 
reasons may be dealt with in traditional village manner.  Tribal justice is often 
described by westerners as arbitrary and brutal and as such can also be 
regarded as a fundamental breach of human rights, but not always.  In many 
cases tribal justice is a vast and successful improvement on the impractical, 
expensive and unsuccessful „solution‟ imprisonment offers western 
countries…even, and perhaps especially, for serious crime such as murder.  As 
one local observer commented: 
It‟s working.  Look at it this way.  Some of these are first time offenders, 
they were just drunk, and they kill somebody.  You lock them up, you and 
I don‟t get anything out of that.  But through [tribal] process the guy who 
killed my son replaces my son.  Then our family become one.  So when I 
have work my son, the one who killed my son, is doing all my work like 
he is my son, your family come and help me.  So he will fish for me, he 
will collect copra, clear the land, just like he was my real son.  So in a 
way it‟s a win-win.  And everybody‟s happy.  We get used to it.  That‟s 
our custom.  When we apologise the whole clan apologises to my clan and 
we forgive you.  We are small.  We know each other.  That‟s why it‟s 
effective.11 
The question remains though, and the main question this thesis attempts to 
answer is, not whether breaches of human rights should be ignored, but how 
external aid providers can help Pacific Islands‟ police and other government 
agencies update traditional solutions to meet human rights conventions and the 
rule of law, within the confines of cultural appropriateness.   
Embedded in these complexities is a very real desire for the police services of 
the region to take control of their issues and find solutions together.  The Pacific 
Islands Chiefs of Police (PICP) has been working to these ends since 1970 and as 
this organisation has grown and its focus changed, the nature of crime has also 
changed.  Globalisation and migration have introduced the dangerous and covert 
                                         
10
 Dame Carol Kidu, "Maternal health in PNG- reality, challenges and possible solutions," in 
Eliminating World Poverty: Global Goals and Regional Progress Symposium (Wellington: Institute of 
Policy Studies, 2009). 
11
 Interview A3. 
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world of transnational organised crime (TOC) and its co-existent response, 
criminal intelligence, to the waters and sands of the Pacific.  These advanced 
crime issues demand sophisticated processes carried out by well trained 
analytical personnel supported with sufficient financial resources.  The police 
services of the Pacific could easily be overwhelmed by the more experienced 
metropolitan countries intent on using policing as a tool of regional control.  
Therefore, while there is a vital role for the well established PICP, there are a 
number of issues that must be addressed to allow this to happen. 
There are a number of prevalent beliefs about policing internationally.  One is 
that Western styled political democracy coupled with democratic policing is the 
only solution to building and maintaining peace in the wake of internal conflict; a 
second is that the elements of modern domestic policing can be exported in their 
entirety to emerging or developing countries leading to the old adage „policing is 
policing is policing‟; and a third assumption is that capacity building can only be 
carried out by representatives of government.  I challenge these assumptions by 
mapping international policing in the Pacific; documenting the voices of the 
Pacific in relation to issues and potential solutions raised in interviews; and 
offering a new approach to meet the policing needs of the emerging countries of 
the Pacific, and the security concerns of donor countries.  However, I do not 
challenge the essential transferability of internationally agreed values and 
standards that are critical in ensuring the rights of all humans are honoured and 
upheld.   
My first argument is based on an understanding of „the rule of law‟.  The rule of 
law is simply described as the legislation set by a legitimate government and the 
belief that no-one is above the law.  This means then, that it is the rule of law 
according to the laws of host countries, and not the laws of the countries 
contributing to peace building in those host countries, which must be honoured 
and upheld.  The rule of law does not extend to dictatorships or other 
instruments of governance taken by force, but my own analysis of the concept is 
that it does extend to traditional or tribal models of governance because they 
have the legitimacy of the people.  I argue that the duties and tasks of 
international policing in the Pacific should be carried out transparently, honestly 
and fairly without prejudice to the rule of law and take into account indigenous 
models of law.    
My second argument is based on the processes of state and capacity building. 
Whilst a whole of government approach is desirable because it is inclusive of all 
parts of government, I argue that contributing countries assert their own values 
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in this restructuring, which reflect their own legal concepts rather than the 
essence of the host‟s rule of law.  I posit that such a situation is undesirable and 
that whole of government change and resultant stability can only properly be 
achieved by insisting that host countries lead and drive change while 
contributing countries offer advice and guidance.   
My third argument is based on the changing political environment within the 
Pacific which challenges relationships based on colonial heritage.  The increasing 
presence of China with an ever larger purse must cause some consternation 
within the foreign affairs departments of both Australia and New Zealand and 
also the US.  China‟s donations come with conditions that are not always overt, 
but without expectations of how they will be used, whereas the significant 
investments made by Australia and New Zealand, in the area they both claim as 
within their neighbourhood, demand close monitoring and accountability.  These 
are heavy demands on cultures with a past based on unwritten language and 
story telling.  I argue that for transparency and accountability an administrative 
partnership that represents all donor countries is required to oversee and assess 
the needs of developing police jurisdictions, to distribute donations accordingly 
and to evaluate the results of such spending.   
My fourth argument is based on the level of involvement of metropolitan 
countries in the Pacific.  Heavy investment in the Pacific by Australia and New 
Zealand in particular has resulted in these two countries taking leadership and 
„board‟ positions in a number of institutions throughout the Pacific, including the 
Pacific Islands Forum and the Pacific Islands Chiefs of Police.  I argue that such 
positions result in a conflict of interest where countries take part in decision 
making and also donate funds; therefore, metropolitan representatives should 
take a consultancy role rather than a leadership one enabling decision makers of 
the Pacific to seek advice but independently to make their own decisions about 
matters that affect them.  
For the purposes of this thesis, the Pacific Region is limited to the Pacific Island 
Countries (PICS) and territories lying in the Pacific Ocean from the Northern 
Mariana Islands and the US State of Hawaii in the north, to New Zealand in the 
South, and from the Republic of Palau and Papua New Guinea in the west, to 
Rapanui12  in the east.  Hawaii and Rapanui, while not independent states, are 
included for their geographical positioning in Polynesia and their shared 
                                         
12
 Rapanui is a province of Chile. 
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settlement histories.13    New Zealand is in the unique position of being both a 
metropolitan state and a Pacific Island country geographically sited in Polynesia.  
Australia is not treated here as a Pacific Island Country although it is usually 
included in Oceania, and Indonesia is omitted because it more naturally forms 
part of the Asian Region.  Timor Leste has been included in the Pacific region by 
some commentators since it became independent from Indonesia in 2005 and 
although it is not considered as a PIC here, it does warrant examination, not only 
for similarities in its peace building operations, but also for kinship and a sense 
of where it belongs.  In all, twenty-six PICs and territories are included in this 
study.14 
Many commentators consider the island countries of the Pacific to be part of the 
Asia-Pacific Region, partly because they were originally settled by migrants from 
Asia.  While Asia and the Pacific Islands regions display intraregional disparity in 
economic and technical development, 15  and have a number of ongoing 
conflicts,16  the Pacific Islands region is sufficiently distinct from Asia through 
other factors; the PICs share their own significantly different histories, languages 
and religions, smaller populations than those of Asia, a lack of land borders17, 
and geographical isolation.  Thus this thesis considers the Pacific Islands to 
constitute a region on its own.18  The Pacific Region is further grouped into three 
sub-regions: Micronesia, Melanesia and Polynesia, each unique but with 
overlapping histories and current needs.  Interestingly, most of the ongoing 
tensions or conflicts occur in the most heavily populated sub-region, Melanesia.  
Being in close geographical proximity to Australia, Melanesian conflicts impact 
significantly on Australia‟s political discourse and foreign policy, particularly since 
                                         
13
 Each strives for indigenous self-determination putting them in the same situation as New 
Caledonia and Wallis and Futuna, and on that basis cannot be excluded even though neither is a 
member of any of the regional organisations highlighted later in this thesis. Grant McCall, "Rapanui 
(Easter Island)," Fiji Times Ltd, http:www2.hawaii.edu/~ogden/piir/pacific/Rapanui.html (accessed 
30 December, 2008), "A Brief History,"  http://www.samoa.co.us/history.html (accessed 9 June, 
2008). "Hawaii History," Hawaiian Roots Website, http://www.hawaiian-roots.com/hawaiihistory.htm 
(accessed 30 December, 2008). 
14
 States and territories covered here are: American Samoa, Australia, Commonwealth of Northern 
Marianas, Cook Islands, Federated States of Micronesia, Fiji, French Polynesia, Guam, Hawaii (USA), 
Kingdom of Tonga, Kiribati, Nauru, Nouvelle Caledonie, New Zealand, Niue, Papua New Guinea, 
Pitcairn Island (UK), Rapanui (Chile), Republic of Marshall Islands, Republic of Palau, Solomon 
Islands, Samoa, Timor Leste, Tokelau, Tuvalu, and Vanuatu. 
15
 "The World Factbook," Central Intelligence Agency, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-
world-factbook/geos/zn.html (accessed 8 October, 2008). 
16
 Benjamin Reilly and Kennedy Graham, "Conflict Through Asia and the Pacific: Causes and Trends," 
in Searching for Peace in Asia Pacific: An Overview of Conflict Preventions and Peacebuilding 
Activities, ed. Annelies Heijmans, Nicola Simmonds, and Hans van de Veen (Boulder, Covent Garden: 
Lynne Reinner Publishers, Inc, 2004), 9-22. 
17
 The exception is Papua New Guinea which shares its island with Irian Jaya. 
18
 It is acknowledged that regions overlap for a number of reasons, including for matters of 
convenience.   However, this study simply considers the Pacific as described and studies only those 
included in footnote 8. 
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the September 2001 terrorist activity on US soil, and the October 2002 terrorist 
bombings in Bali, Indonesia. 
Policing and justice models in many PICs reflect the Westminster system but 
with some local cultural flavour, while others reflect the French or USA systems, 
but all are heavily supported through the provision of personnel, resources and 
training either by Australia, New Zealand, France or the US or a combination of 
them, including the European Union.   The Regional Assistance Mission to 
Solomon Islands (RAMSI) has been a feature of the Solomon Islands since July 
2003 and currently has five hundred and seventy-two personnel involved as 
civilians, Participating Police Force (PPF), and military from fifteen PIF 
countries.19  Apart from RAMSI, personnel from Australia and New Zealand are 
involved in capacity building roles in the police services of Cook Islands, Nauru, 
Niue, Tonga and Timor Leste. 
Research Methods and Methodology 
I have chosen to approach the study through both external and internal lenses.  
These are my own terms. The former simply means the view seen by looking at 
what is considered a problem from those external to it but with the „power‟ to 
change or solve it.  Conversely, an internal lens means exploring issues or 
situations from the inside by those involved in them.  These two views often 
overlap, but more specifically, the external lens is used to provide a political 
overview of metropolitan interests in the region while the internal lens offers a 
comprehensive overview of organisations within the Pacific. Utilising both views 
demonstrates the multiplicity of the region‟s challenges.  
To gather an appreciation of the complexities of the Pacific Region I am 
reminded of Max Weber‟s verstehen – the deep understanding one is afforded 
from standing in another man‟s shoes, 20  and which cannot be expressed in 
numbers.  Therefore, the design of this research was based on a flexible 
qualitative approach seeking to find out what and why, rather than providing a 
quantitative assessment of how much and how many.  In-depth interviews 
provided powerful and vibrant stories as well as data about the impacts of 
metropolitan states, regionalisation and policing.21 
                                         
19
 Administrator, "Contributing Nations," Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands, 
http://www.ramsi.org/node/8 (accessed 09 January, 2009). 
20
 Max Weber (1864-1920), one of the founding fathers of sociology. 
21
 Zina O'Leary, The Essential Guide to Doing Research (London, Thousand Oaks, New Delhi, 
Singapore: Sage Publications Ltd, 2004; reprint, 2007)., Fiona Hutton,  
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The use of semi-structured one-on-one interviews with key informants was 
deemed appropriate to the complex nature of the region and the research 
questions, so an interview schedule was designed around six sections.22  The first 
section asked respondents about their roles and organisations; the second 
related to the Pacific Islands Chief of Police,23 its regional policing-focus, and 
opinions on its success; the third section focussed on country donations and 
contributions; the fourth asked questions about regional collaboration and 
cooperation; the fifth discussed perceptions of power across the region and the 
most important factors impacting on policing and the region; and the sixth and 
final section related to policing models that have been developed or left behind 
by colonisers, and the respondent‟s vision of the future of policing in the Pacific.  
The face-to-face semi-structured interviews offered the opportunity to probe for 
clarification or further information.  Because respondents originated from a wide 
range of countries, consideration was given to the need for interpreters.  
However, this proved unnecessary as all respondents spoke English to a 
reasonable or high standard.  Once the data was collected it was transcribed to 
word documents identified only by the alphanumeric code allotted and 
transferred to a qualitative analysis tool, NVivo8. 
Interviews were carried out in two stages, in Apia, Samoa, in September 2008, 
and in Wellington, New Zealand, between October and December 2008.  Written 
responses were obtained from some Australian contributors.  Respondents were 
approached by mail and telephone with a request for an interview, provided with 
written information about the research, and given a consent form which they 
were asked to sign prior to the interview.24  All respondents requested a synopsis 
of the thesis after it was completed with one requesting a copy of the full thesis.  
Prior to the interview, respondents were given an opportunity to seek 
clarification about the research and to ask questions about it.  All face-to-face 
interviews, with one exception, were digitally recorded.  All respondents were 
offered and given confidentiality because of perceived or real sensitivities 
between metropolitan and small island state actors.  Respondents are therefore 
only identified by alphanumeric code.  Each interview took between thirty and 
ninety minutes.  After the interview had been completed respondents were given 
a small gift to thank them for their time, such as a magnetic note pad, key ring 
or ornament depicting Maori imagery, which were received with surprise and 
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appreciation.  This entire procedure was approved by Victoria University of 
Wellington‟s Human Ethics Committee. 
Because of the wide range of this study, attempts were made to recruit 
participants from police, foreign affairs and other regional organisations.  It was 
important to speak to as many respondents from the Pacific Island Countries as 
possible and therefore I targeted the Pacific Islands Chiefs of Police and their 
Secretariat at Conference in Apia, Samoa.  This strategy was successful and 
secured interviews from fourteen of the twenty-one members.  In addition, nine 
interviews were conducted with personnel from donor countries and other 
regional organisations, including PIFS25 and PRPI,26 resulting in a total of twenty-
three interviews. 
The interview data form much of the discussion throughout the thesis. 
Secondary data have been found in newspaper articles and other media reports.    
Key stakeholders in the US, Japan, China and Taiwan were not interviewed for 
this study and therefore their views are absent.  Given time and resource 
constraints such interviews were not feasible. However, an indication of the 
importance and impacts of these countries is gained from the respondents and 
secondary sources.   
In the interests of time and word constraints, this thesis does not explore or 
examine five important areas which my research revealed as having an impact 
on the region and on building a deeper understanding of the issues.  First, the 
history and current status of the relationship between New Zealand and Australia 
has a profound effect on the region.  Historically bound through common origins 
the two countries formed a relationship of alliance and friendship, particularly 
when working in their common backyard, the Pacific.  But this relationship has 
been continually tested during times of disagreement between the two where 
Australia has abandoned New Zealand in favour of the US.27  Although still seen 
as traditional partners, future academic study of the relationship, particularly as 
it relates to policing in the region would be useful.  Second, a comparative study 
of the EU and PIFS would be beneficial, particularly considering governance 
through a regional parliament, a regional court and a regional police force.  I do 
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not advocate that an EU type model should be transferred to the Pacific28 since 
further study is warranted to provide a clearer picture of the complexities of the 
region and feasible ways of improving policing in the region.  Third, African, 
Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries are designated developing countries by the 
United Nations, but as a group, have not been addressed in this thesis.  A 
comparison of Caribbean and Pacific Countries could be of value particularly due 
to their geographical similarities.  However, the complexities of each region need 
to be fully explored in relation to policing and regionalism.  Fourth, although the 
judiciary is the beginning and end process of policing, there is no space in this 
thesis to conduct extensive analysis of the state of the judiciary in the Pacific.  
Fifth, the issue of aid was found to be significant.  Many of the issues raised by 
respondents related to larger questions concerning international development 
assistance.  As this was unanticipated, this thesis only examines this aspect very 
briefly, but it appears that my conclusions are in harmony with emerging 
critiques of the dominant approach and thus this interrelationship deserves 
future expanded analysis.   
So far, in Chapter One I have introduced the topic and the region, drawn 
attention to key terms used throughout the thesis, presented the overall 
question and arguments, and identified the aims, methodology and limitations of 
the thesis.  The remainder of this thesis is structured as follows. 
Chapter Two provides a review of the literature relating to international policing 
methods and policy, globalisation and regionalisation, and foreign policies 
impacting on the Pacific. 
Chapter Three presents respondents‟ visions of policing in the region and 
analyses the first set of questions through an „external lens‟ concerning the 
impacts of metropolitan powers on Pacific Island Countries.29  The chapter maps 
current models of international policing in the region and introduces the 
metropolitan and other states involved in the region through their contributions 
of aid,  thus contributing to my first argument concerning the understanding of 
„the rule of law‟ and how aid providers contribute.  The interviewees raised a 
number of issues including globalisation, colonisation, aid, personnel training and 
resources, and a lack of attention to their cultures and needs.  These discussions 
relate to my second argument, the processes of state and capacity building.  
Chapter Three presents and analyses these issues and offers a new approach to 
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international policing in the region which meets the needs of the emerging 
countries of the Pacific, and the donor countries.  This analysis enhances my 
third argument about the significance of the changing political environment and 
colonial relationships. 
Chapter Four examines a second group of questions which arise from the view 
through an internal lens and studies the regional organisations in the Pacific, the 
dynamics caused by those organisations and how they impact on the 
development of regional architecture. An overview of the regional organisations 
is provided, followed by an assessment of the links of cooperation, collaboration 
and coordination of these efforts.  The agencies analysed were selected on the 
basis of their links to political agendas, civil society and law enforcement.  There 
is no other publication that explains or presents the organisations of the Pacific 
as comprehensively as this study and therefore it makes a valuable contribution 
to the current literature and understanding of the region.  This chapter 
contributes to my fourth argument, which relates to a conflict of interest for fund 
providers who also take roles as decision makers within regional organisations; 
and supports the assessments made in Chapter Three. 
Chapter Five draws together the main findings and proffers recommendations to 
inform future policy in relation to financial aid, policing, and ways of engaging 
with Pacific Island Countries. 
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CHAPTER TWO: Policing, Colonisation and 
Globalisation,  
This chapter reviews the literature published up until the beginning of 2009 on 
policing in the Pacific.  The works fall into three main areas: international 
policing methods and policy; globalisation and regionalisation, and the foreign 
policies of metropolitan and emerging powers with interests in the Pacific.30  
Pacific Policing in the International Context 
A common thread running through the development literature, both economic 
and political, is the acknowledgement that development cannot be progressed 
without law and order.  Therefore, policing and police services are critical in 
making and keeping the peace and in maintaining social control.  The Pacific 
Region offers a unique blend of policing needs ranging from traditional domestic 
policing carried out by local jurisdictions to international policing carried out 
under the guise of bilateral or multilateral agreements.   
Transnational policing was transported by the British and French colonisers to 
many parts of the world.  Today‟s open markets, increased communication and 
ease of transportation have forced police agencies to adapt their processes and 
build partnerships to allow them to keep up with the globalisation of crime, 
working across borders in the process.  Transnational policing is based on highly 
technical surveillance and international information sharing about the movement 
of commodities by transnational criminals.  But, state capacity-building is also a 
feature of transnational policing 31  and scholarly research also includes 
paramilitary and counter-insurgency missions. 32   Further discourse explores 
international responses to issues of transnational crime, 33  terrorism, and 
peacekeeping efforts. 34   Transnational law enforcement needs heightened 
cooperation between states to ensure justice is done outside the limited 
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jurisdictions of investigating officers involving cross-state cooperation as well as 
cross-agency cooperation. 35   Much of the early literature finds transnational 
policing is mostly involved in covert surveillance combined with political liaison.36   
That is, a high ranking member of a police service is deployed for a (usually) two 
year period to another country.  This role generally sits in the high commission 
or embassy of the member‟s home country and is responsible for diplomatic and 
political liaison between the two countries, and also for intelligence matters.  
The role of International Police Liaison officers is relatively new, involving only 
small numbers of police in postings all over the world.  They are the physical and 
political interface between the police of the country of residence and their own 
domestic police service in matters of security, terrorism, transnational crime and 
immigration. 37   However, liaison roles are taken up at a number of ranks 
depending on the originating police service, and their work can be carried out 
either from within the destination country‟s police service or the originating 
country‟s embassy.  In Europe within the Schengen38 countries, liaison officers 
work side-by-side in offices at joint internal borders.  In 2009, New Zealand 
Police had nine highly ranked personnel deployed in seven countries including 
Thailand, China, Australia, Indonesia, Fiji, England and the US.39  In 2007-2008 
Australian Federal Police had eighty-three international liaison officers at various 
ranks deployed in twenty-seven countries.40  In 2008, China intended to improve 
its international policing relationships by sending anti-terrorism liaison officers to 
Australia and other countries concerned about the terrorist threat.  This would 
add to the thirty liaison officers currently deployed by China in nineteen 
countries including the US, the UK, Russia, Thailand, Afghanistan, Pakistan, 
Turkey, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan.41  
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 Sheptycki, "Introduction". 
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Theoretically, transnational policing is a natural progression of the globalisation 
of crime with the transnational law enforcement community enforcing the rules 
and laws made through relationships with trans-governmental networks.  
Applying international relations theory to international crime control, the need to 
control transnational crime requires greater cooperation through bilateral and 
multilateral agreements that eliminate obstacles to international crime control.  
Differing crime fighting systems, political tensions, or conflicting sovereignties 
are encouraged to cooperate in establishing generic criminal laws and guidelines 
and frameworks that smooth the progress of international law enforcement and 
justice. However, a different viewpoint emphasises the role of the state in 
facilitating bilateral and multilateral agreements that are weighted towards 
powerful states‟ interests and agendas.  These often tend towards imposing, or 
retaining, colonial and imperialist models of law and justice.  The dissolution of 
the British, French and other empires at the end of World War Two turned 
cooperation between the police jurisdictions within empires into international 
policing suggesting a simple exportation of western ideals and morals for political 
and economic gain.   A third view is, that what is deemed criminal and in need of 
control, is changeable.  Fear, suspicion and prejudice about religions such as 
Islam, moral indignation about human rights abuses occurring in other countries, 
and a renewed emphasis on what is deemed right and wrong, create a 
groundswell of action and reaction in the international order.  These actions and 
reactions are encased in United Nations Declarations that create international 
criminal offences to protect the human rights of world citizens.42   
In order to police breaches of human rights and particularly to bring peace and 
social control following internal conflicts, the United Nations is responsible for 
establishing peacekeeping missions.  These are made up of personnel from a 
range of countries with the consent of conflicting parties which include the 
military as well as civilian police who help in securing short-term law and order 
and in long-term establishment of „efficient, accountable national police forces 
which reinforce the rule of law‟.43  According to the United Nations in December 
2006 there were 8,482 police from ninety-one countries serving in thirteen UN 
Police missions.44  As of May 2007 there were 9,565 personnel from ninety-three 
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countries involved in thirteen missions.45  By December 2007 that number had 
risen to 11,077 personnel from one hundred and nineteen countries involved in 
eleven missions.46   
An increase of internal conflicts over the last few years of the 20th Century 
meant an increase in deployments of UN civilian police and this caused a drain 
on domestic policing instigating a recommendation for, among many other 
points, a pool of police ready for rapid deployment. 47   The European Union 
responded with a rapid-reaction police force of one thousand four hundred 
personnel ready to deploy within thirty days and a further five thousand in 
reserve.  In 2004 the Australian Federal Police (AFP) established the 
International Deployment Group (IDG) with a pool of two hundred police 
personnel ready for rapid-response deployment.48  New Zealand responded by 
establishing the International Services Group (ISG) in 2005 to manage overseas 
deployments and overseas liaison posts.49 
The establishment of peacekeeping by the United Nations in 1948 as the first 
stage of democratising institutions around the world involved, in most cases, the 
civilian police from a number of countries. 50   The role of peacekeepers has 
changed over time from monitoring and observing indigenous police to armed 
law enforcement from 1994, and the inclusion of programmes such as Support 
for human rights, Monitoring And Reporting, and Advising and Training (SMART) 
from 1995.   These developments have meant the peacekeeper‟s role now is to 
establish democratic policing methods underpinned by a set of principles51 as 
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part of democracy building after conflict has ended.  The principles of democratic 
policing then are: the inclusion of internationally agreed human rights, acting 
within lawful authority, accountability for actions, and an appropriately prioritised 
response in securing the safety of community members.52 
Another facet of international policing is transitional policing, described as a state 
intervention following an abrupt change in the political environment of a country 
that is not intended as a long-term role. 53   The Australian-led Regional 
Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI) is a type of transitional policing 
that followed the Solomon Islands government‟s plea for assistance in 2000 from 
Australia and New Zealand.54  However, RAMSI has brought much criticism which 
recognises and acknowledges unique issues for policing in the Pacific that are 
connected to strong and varied cultural identities and informal traditional 
systems combined with legacies of colonial legal systems.  This brings challenges 
for Australia and New Zealand in their attempts to establish democracy and 
western models in a vast region of small island states, small populations and 
isolation from markets, factors which impact on states‟ economies.  Western 
style policing models appear to be inappropriate, but the Pacific Islands Forum 
and the Pacific Islands Chiefs of Police have an important part to play in the 
development of policing models in the region.  What is essential is that it must 
be the peoples of the Pacific, not external donors, who shape their own modern 
police models.55   
The terrorist attacks in New York 2001, Bali 2002 and Jakarta 2003 changed the 
policy and strategy of both Australia and New Zealand, concerning the 
immediate region.  The Australian Federal Police (AFP) now has a focus on 
peacekeeping and regional capacity-building in vulnerable states in the region.  
Their hands-on role includes direct intervention with the „insertion‟ of police into 
key roles in offshore jurisdictions rather than purely advisory positions.  
Furthermore, the AFP has taken independent management of and responsibility 
for policing initiatives away from AusAID, to ensure that increasing police 
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capacity is part of a whole of government approach to aid in the region.  The 
direct implantation of personnel in key roles and the invasive nature of 
Australia‟s assertiveness is seen by some Pacific leaders and communities as 
offensive and a risk to national sovereignty.  Australia‟s insistence on immunity 
for their officers working in the region also caused friction and the dissolution of 
the Australian Enhanced Cooperation Programme in Papua New Guinea in less 
than twelve months.56  
This type of approach lacks strategic vision and tactical skill.  Success in building 
capacity in democratic police organisations requires seven „must-do‟s‟.  
According to Bayley these are: „adapting reforms to local conditions‟; „persuading 
local stakeholder to support reform‟; „treating aid recipients as partners‟; 
„develop a comprehensive plan‟; „prepare for the long haul‟; „coordinate 
assistance efforts‟; and „sending the right people into the field‟.57   Unpacking 
these „to do‟s‟ creates some understanding of how capacity building and 
democratic policing can be harmoniously achieved.58   
External Policies and Pacific Island Countries 
Pacific Island Countries have undergone momentous upheavals through 
colonisation over the past few hundred years and decolonisation since the United 
Nations Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and 
peoples in 1960.  Decolonisation has resulted in the granting of independence 
and sovereignty to an increasing number of countries which become eligible for 
membership in the United Nations General Assembly.59  While those that have 
gained their independence grappled with rediscovering their identity and 
analysing their new place in the world, others in the Pacific are still struggling for 
self-determination and independence from colonisers.   
During the mid-1980s New Caledonia was the scene of violent clashes between 
the indigenous Kanak population and the French colonising government.  These 
clashes led to negotiations for independence, and the Matignon Accords provided 
for a vote on the future of New Caledonia to be held in 1998.  But, in 1998 new 
negotiations for a fifteen year delay in the referendum on self-determination and 
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independence were stipulated in the Noumea Accord. 60   The nature of the 
Noumea Accord with its creation of shared sovereignty with the Republic of 
France and abolition of „overseas territory‟ status was ground-breaking.  The 
Accord also replaces the Territorial Congress with new political institutions, 
makes moves to recognise Kanak culture and identity and transfers 
administrative power from France to New Caledonia.  However, France‟s powers 
relating to justice, public order, defence, finance and currency will not be 
transferred to the new order until the results of the final referendum on self-
determination have been counted at some time in the future; and, whether they 
will ever be transferred will depend on the referendum itself.61  These are not the 
only concerns over broader questions of independence and sovereignty. 
New Zealand and Australia made speedy moves to hand over their Pacific Island 
territories to their original settlers, taking a hands-off approach.62  Whilst this 
approach appears on the surface as a supportive and independent stance, new 
sovereignties were left with models of governance that were strange to their 
customs and impossible to maintain.  Indigenous peoples had been left out of 
the governance and running of their countries and had little knowledge of the 
workings of such institutions.  Neither did they have the resources to maintain 
these structures. 63   Globalisation expects and provides for development but 
Pacific Island Countries were in a position of survival and rediscovery and, by 
world standards, poverty.64  A hands-off approach may have been acceptable 
during the sixties but rich countries have since developed a new global 
conscience.   
Two factors changed western foreign policy at the beginning of the new 
millennium, the United Nations Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) to end 
poverty,65 and the terrorist attacks on New York‟s World Trade Centre in 2001.  
The MDGs have resulted in significant changes to OECD countries‟ foreign policy 
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as a response to the burden of responsibility in providing aid to developing 
countries.  The World Bank defines all of the islands in the Pacific as developing 
nations66 with the exception of Guam, French Polynesia and New Caledonia and 
although the MDGs have caused unprecedented commitment to development, 
recent studies challenge the degree of real change in the Pacific.67 
The terrorist attacks on American soil were the catalyst of an abrupt change in 
the language and strategies of the US, Britain and Australia.68   Australia‟s Prime 
Minister of the time, John Howard, pledged unconditional military support to the 
US the day following the bombings of the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon, 
which resulted in some critical commentary in Australia.  Prior to 9/11, terrorism 
was relegated to the same low priority as other security risks including the 
environment, human rights, people smuggling and HIV/AIDS.69  But, the Jemaah 
Islamiyah bombings of Bali in 2002 were the turning point in the dramatic 
change in the flavour and language used in policy for constructing defence of 
Australian borders and regional security. 70   Pacific Island nations, previously 
considered a benign security threat, were suddenly described as failing or rogue 
states within an arc of instability from Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, 
Vanuatu, and New Caledonia to Fiji, and providing safe haven and recruitment 
centres for terrorists.71  This language of fear stimulated public support for direct 
intervention by the Australian government in others‟ affairs and lands regardless 
of sovereignty „if it considers its security interests are threatened‟.72   
There is robust debate over the terms „failed state‟ and „arc of instability‟ and the 
practical uses of the terms.  The concept of a failed state conjures images of well 
developed and firmly established state institutions that have been unable to 
stem a break-down in social order.  Pacific Island Countries are in the forming 
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phase of becoming „modern states‟, necessary in a globalising world, and most 
are still developing an understanding of centralised governance.  However, such 
an understanding may never be fully realised in communities that traditionally 
seek governance through clan and cultural norms.  Accordingly, there is a 
mismatch between emerging states and the foreign policy and expectations of 
long established modern states seeking to secure their national borders, and 
OECD countries charged with new responsibilities in providing development aid 
to developing and emerging countries.73   
Apart from Australia, New Zealand, the US and France, the Pacific game is also 
played by China, Taiwan and Japan, and strategy, diplomacy, aid and natural 
resources are elements in the game.  Recognition that China has become a 
major player in the Pacific, is tempered by claims that China is not sufficiently 
endowed with either soft or hard power to cause concern for the US and 
Australia and that China‟s weight is felt in its „no-strings-attached‟ development 
funding and increasing trade deals.74   Another view centres on Taiwan‟s push for 
recognition at the United Nations and subsequent competition with China in 
securing formal diplomatic agreements with strategic sovereignties.  Although 
Taiwan has partnerships only with a few developing small and microstates, it has 
achieved a democratic government and met global human rights standards, 
strengthening the case for separatism from China.75  Another analyst argues the 
rise of China as a power in the region has occurred by default through small 
investments economically, diplomatically and strategically, as the US and Britain 
have withdrawn their interest from the area.  Thus, rather than a cause for 
concern over regional competition for power, China provides endless 
opportunities for collegial development partnerships. 76   The debate about 
whether China is seen as a political threat or looming hegemon is set to continue 
especially because China is seen by some observers as the only world power 
with the blue water capability of plying the vast Pacific Ocean without any real 
supervision from Australia, whose interests lie in the seas and oceans to their 
west, or New Zealand, who has little to offer in the way of blue water 
surveillance.  The effects of China‟s investment in the region are already obvious 
in the mining, logging and fishing industries and an increasing Chinese Diaspora 
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community said to be responsible for an increase in organised crime and 
corruption within government institutions.77 
The Pacific region is the receiver of some of the highest levels of development 
funds from all corners of the earth but performs worse than most other 
developing regions.78  Australia and New Zealand are significant donors to the 
Pacific Region, with Australia focussed on its own security issues, while arguably 
New Zealand is more concerned with identification with the Pacific and its 
peoples.  Nevertheless, both countries recognise the need for speedy action to 
address the challenges to the Pacific region in areas of governance, economic 
growth and environmental change. 79   The „whole of government‟ approach 
applied in the Pacific integrates cross departmental policy instruments to 
alleviate poverty, increase accountability and capability in governance and 
assists in stabilising emerging states. 80   All commentators agree that 
development cannot occur in a climate of poverty or civil unrest and that policing 
is central to maintaining societal order and safety. 
Globalisation, Internationalisation & Regionalisation 
Globalisation, as defined by rich people like us, is a very nice 
thing...you are talking about the Internet, you are talking about cell 
phones, you are talking about computers.  This doesn't affect two-
thirds of the people in the world (President Jimmy Carter).81 
Although this thesis focuses on one particular region, the larger forces of 
globalisation need also to be understood in order to provide a fuller context for 
the analysis of policing.   
Arguably, globalisation has had the biggest impact on developing countries since 
industrialisation, as borders open up and international standards such as human 
rights are imposed.  Globalisation is designed to remove barriers to the 
movement of goods, services, people and information in order to grow national 
economies.  It links people on one side of the world with markets on the other 
and has opened up new opportunities for trade with non-traditional partners.  
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The advent of technology has sped up this capability so that exchanges all over 
the world can take place instantly in real time, without leaving the office or living 
room. 82   Imagine having the capability of reaching almost four-fifths of the 
world‟s six billion people at one time.  This occurred during the 2008 Beijing 
Olympics with the use of about sixty outside broadcast vans, one thousand 
cameras, four thousand staff and two hundred broadcasters who made four 
thousand hours of live viewing available to a cumulative audience of over forty 
billion. 83   While this example conveys the omnipresence of globalisation, as 
pointed out so poignantly by President Jimmy Carter, the benefits of 
globalisation are not always realised by the poorest countries and peoples.  Even 
though computers and televisions are now much more readily available in 
developing or emerging countries, and in the Pacific, and tourism is a national 
income, the new awakening brings pressures on customary ways of life and new 
expectations of lifestyle. 
Three forces have contributed to globalisation.  First, technology has reduced the 
cost of doing business; second, the decrease in the cost of communication and of 
doing business, has resulted in increased trade and tourism; and third, the 
growth of regional economic integration has resulted in the clustering of smaller 
groups.84  These forces resulted in a new division of labour, with transnational 
corporations driving the bulk of global production, which has taken over from 
trade in servicing international markets. 85   Corporations have been the main 
actors in the growth of globalisation as they have taken their business offshore 
for bigger financial gain.86  This has also often resulted in the exploitation of 
disadvantaged peoples in developing countries and therefore the benefits of 
globalisation most often accrue to the wealthy, impinging on the human rights of 
the poor.87  Furthermore, an increase in tourism also alters the dynamics of 
developing societies with an increase in crime generally targeted against tourists 
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whose lifestyle is inconsistent with the populace they visit.  Even so, increased 
industrialisation and tourism in developing countries contributes to economic 
growth.88    As the economies of more and more nations become increasingly 
entwined, secondary actors, national and international government 
organisations, have joined the „game‟ with the role of regulating global trade, 
which may or may not be successful in levelling the playing field.  The World 
Trade Organisation (WTO) takes on this role dealing with rules of trade between 
countries and is the only global organisation with this mandate.  Perhaps the 
most important actor, and the third to be raised here, is civil society in the form 
of non-governmental agencies (NGOs) which, as part of the community itself, 
have a unique advantage in hands-on knowledge, can act in the interests of 
human rights, and are essential partners for government agencies in sustainable 
development.89 
Region building can occur much more informally and for non-economic purposes.  
Some regions are formed geographically, or in response to crises which need a 
coordinated response such as a state collapse as seen in West Africa,90 or ethnic 
conflicts which threaten state stability such as those seen in the South Pacific.91  
This „new regionalism‟ is not bound by economic arrangements for free trade but 
goes beyond it to include political, security, social and cultural issues and reflects 
political ambition, by some, in creating identity and coherence regionally. 92  
Although for others, the nature of regionalisation suggests disintegration of 
territorial boundaries and to some extent the dissolving of sovereignty, or the 
use of sovereignty as a bargaining chip in political processes involving aid where 
asymmetric flows create one-sided dependence and vulnerabilities.93  A changing 
focus on issues other than economic means a change in the architecture of 
regions.   
This change is recognised in discourse about the Pacific‟s regional architecture 
which suggests that a new regional security organisation should be convened 
with China, Japan, Korea, the US, Russia, the ASEAN states, Australia, New 
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Zealand and India as members, and a regular meeting of heads of states should 
be established where multilateral issues could be discussed and bi-lateral 
contacts made.  Such a structure should not be too diverse and key heads of 
government would need to be carefully identified.  This arrangement provides an 
opportunity for the APEC heads of government meeting to revert to its original 
status as a heads of finance meeting as the high point of APEC.94  Whilst an 
important part of the Pacific regional architecture, the only Pacific Islands 
member of APEC is Papua New Guinea, therefore it is important for a purely 
Pacific regional structure to represent those voices at APEC.   
The Pacific Islands Forum should fill this role.  However, New Zealand‟s Prime 
Minister of the time, Helen Clark, instigated a significant review of the Forum‟s 
role and Secretariat in 2003 resulting in the writing of a Pacific Plan designed to 
develop the small Pacific Island Countries.  An Eminent Persons Group (EPG)95 
was given one month to review, consult and report on their findings, meaning 
that there was little time to consult widely and in depth.96  Pacific peoples and 
their culture are at the forefront of Pacific life and although the EPG‟s report 
agreed that „cultural identity‟ required „immediate attention‟, the 2005 Plan did 
not reflect this point.97  While subsequently the Plan was rewritten in an attempt 
to address this, it is an issue which is a continuing reflection of the region‟s 
background.  I discuss these points more fully in Chapter Three.  
Conclusion 
Over the past few years there has been an increase in international policing that 
impacts on developing countries, including those in the Pacific region.  There are 
a number of factors that help explain this.  The first is globalisation and the 
second is regionalisation.  Globalisation affects even the smallest countries 
through economic trade and technological advances.  For a country to progress 
and prosper it must be encouraged to trade with other countries within its own 
region and across the globe.  Technology has reached most corners of the world 
decreasing the cost of communication and transport and accelerating to the 
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speed of light the ability to communicate with others everywhere.  These forces 
have also extended to crime and law enforcement.    
The end of colonialism and the beginning of self-determination and self-
governance has placed the economies and societies of small and newly 
independent countries in an emergent or developing state.  In many places this 
and lines drawn on maps by past colonisers have caused conflict between 
ethnicities.  Countries in conflict have been labelled weak, failing or failed states 
by metropolitan states, but that label assumes that something already 
established had failed or broken.  Commentators argue that this is not the case 
as these newly independent states have not had the benefit of a hundred years 
to build and establish their models of government and economy.  They have 
been left a legacy of Westphalia structures but no instruction booklet on how to 
ensure their sustainability or efficacy. 
Interests in matters of security following the end of the Cold War and terrorist 
events in the US and Indonesia, as well as United Nations interests in the rule of 
law and human rights have been the causes of abrupt changes in the foreign 
policies of metropolitan states.  In the Pacific this is evident in an about-turn 
from a hands-off approach in the interests of sovereignty, to direct intervention 
with whole-of-government strategies by Australia through the Australian Federal 
Police (AFP) in the interests of regional and national security.  Although much of 
the literature refers to Australia and the AFP as being the instigators of regional 
missions there is less in the literature about the roles of New Zealand in 
particular, and other Pacific countries, which are also heavily involved in policing 
across borders. 
In sum, there remain large gaps in the literature about the effects of 
decolonisation and the continuing impacts of metropolitan states on the small 
island countries of the Pacific.  There is little in the literature that explains the 
relationships of regional organisations and how they affect dynamics in the 
region and although there is a growing body of work on policing in the region, it 
mostly concentrates on Australia‟s efforts in RAMSI and post-conflict 
peacekeeping missions.  While there are volumes of information about policing 
as a profession, evidently, there is a dearth of information about what the police 
jurisdictions of the Pacific actually need and want in the way of building modern 
domestic policing models that provide local social control as well as international 
security.  The remaining chapters in this thesis attempt to correct this deficiency. 
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CHAPTER THREE: The Politics of Policing 
Pacific Island Countries 
Policing is a core feature of national security, economic growth, community 
safety and security, crime prevention and community reassurance, road safety 
and emergency management.  Successfully executing this role in a regional 
setting requires honest and open collaboration between police services and 
jurisdictions by professionals who value high standards of integrity and 
accountability and who lead and develop their organisations to these standards.   
Policing in the Pacific is complex and forms the crossroads for a number of 
global, regional and domestic strategies involving various stakeholders including 
Interpol, the Australian Federal Police (AFP) and Australian government, the New 
Zealand Police (NZP) and the New Zealand government, and the police services 
of Pacific Island Countries.  Decisions about policing that affect the region as a 
whole have been discussed and made by the Pacific Islands Chiefs of Police 
(PICP) since 1970, a body of twenty-one member countries. 
The smallness and isolation of many of the PICP police services and their island 
countries means cooperation is essential.  The development of protocols to 
facilitate the movement of criminals and investigators across borders and 
sharing information to ensure justice is done is ongoing.  But, this smallness also 
creates challenges for external players who need to listen and creatively assist in 
developing in-country law and justice processes in partnership with those who 
live in these small states.  Just as their differences are to be celebrated, the rule 
of law and human rights must also form part of the vision of policing in the 
Pacific.  However, the ultimate goal of overseas involvement in policing must be 
the independence of the individual police forces, alongside cooperation amongst 
them.  This goal was voiced by the respondents to this study during interviews 
when asked about their vision of future policing in their homeland and region.  
Nearly all discussed sustainable police services that no longer needed to rely on 
donors, and a safe Pacific region where all of the police services in the region 
work together to achieve this.  A typical response was: 
In the long term, each country is able to control its own and effective law 
enforcement organisation and environment for communities that accords 
with the spirit and principles of the rule of law - at the same time 
respecting local indigenous cultures and identities.  They should have 
good governance and support access to justice and protection and 
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promotion of human rights of Pacific Community members and the rule of 
law.98 
This vision seems practical and achievable but there are a number of difficulties 
that stand in the way.  The Pacific Islands and the ocean in which they rest are 
highly important to the large and influential metropolitan countries on the Pacific 
Rim including the United States, Japan, China, Taiwan, Australia and New 
Zealand.  The Commonwealth of Nations, France and the European Union also 
have a vested interest in the area through their history in the region.  European 
Empire building in the 18th Century and two World Wars and decolonisation in 
the 20th Century have all shaped and continue to influence the domestic policy 
and models of government of Pacific Island nations and territories.  Many PIC 
governments mirror those of colonial rulers which, in the contemporary world, 
appear culturally inappropriate and, for countries with low populations and 
emerging economies, are costly to maintain.99  This means then a reliance on 
external funds which sets the stage for a clash of values and agendas between 
external players focused on national security, diplomacy battles, and retention of 
territory claimed through colonisation, and societies seeking to re-establish their 
own identities and values in a changed world.  Included in this mix is the bounty 
offered up by the vast Pacific Ocean and its island countries in the way of fishing 
rights, minerals and metals, exotic timbers and black pearls. 
The twenty-six PICs are pawns in a battle for influence on the international stage 
between the rising power of China, the Pacific‟s self-appointed hegemon, 
Australia, in reluctant and pesky partnership with NZ, the USA as a declining 
superpower, and the increasingly powerful EU.  And in the background, Taiwan 
has built and maintains strong economic and trade relationships with almost all 
PICs as well as Australia and New Zealand, but only holds formal democratic 
relationships with six PICs.100  All of these countries invest heavily in the Pacific 
through aid payments related to national security, peace and capacity building, 
improvements to health and welfare, and economic development.  In reality, 
money speaks volumes and small populations, along with a high risk of 
environmental damage and little hope of significant independent economic 
growth, place the governments of these developing nations between the 
proverbial rock and a hard place.  One participant was eloquent in explaining this 
problem: 
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In many respects it all boils down to the fact that he who has the dollars 
calls the tune, and to the extent that a Chinese, Japanese, Australian, 
New Zealand, [or] EU supply of funds is made available the recipients 
acknowledge the power of that.  They have to weigh up […] how much of 
their national sovereignty they want to surrender in consideration for the 
supply of this aid.  And they‟re making those judgements all the time.101 
It has been noted in the literature that Western models of policing are 
incompatible with Pacific Islands‟ culture102 so it is appropriate to explore how 
the international community can add compatible value to the developing nations 
of the Pacific.  It is also appropriate to visit the idea of the rule of law, its 
connections to interventions and other policing advances in the Pacific, and the 
policing needs of Pacific Island Countries.    
The most discussed and written about of policing interventions in the Pacific is 
the Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI), followed by the 
mission to Timor Leste.  Both of these post-conflict missions, the first a regional 
mission and the second a United Nations (UN) mission, resulted from a break 
down in civil order and have been highly profiled in the media.  In 2010, both 
were in a transitional policing phase although the Solomon Islands situation was 
more advanced.  Another UN intervention resulting from conflict during 1989-
1999, the Bougainville Community Policing Project (BCPP), continues in 2009, in 
a capacity building mode with just seven NZP personnel.   
There have also been other notable initiatives.  In 2004 the Pacific Regional 
Policing Initiative (PRPI)103 was established to strengthen policing in the Pacific 
by AusAID with A$14.5 million and NZAID NZ$2.5 million over five years, with 
in-kind contributions from Fiji, until the latter‟s suspension from the PICP after 
the 2006 coup d‟etat.  The PRPI provided training to police in Forum member 
countries but its contract ended at the end of 2008 and was replaced by the 
Pacific Policing Development Programme (PPDP). 104   In 2007, collaborative 
planning involving NZP, NZAID and the PICP resulted in the Pacific Prevention of 
Domestic Violence Programme (PPDVP) which is being implemented in an 
increasing number of PICs.  Australia‟s Transnational Crime Units (TCUs) have 
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been established in a number of PICs105 to gather intelligence that is coordinated 
and disseminated by the Pacific Transnational Crime Coordination Centre 
(PTCCC).  The AFP and NZP provide direct assistance and capacity building to 
police in a number of PICs, with personnel placed in strategic leadership roles.  
Furthermore, a growing number of countries are placing police liaison officers in 
their embassies and high commissions right across the world. 
The next section of this chapter explores the complexities of the different 
elements of international policing in the Pacific and uses examples to explain 
them. The chapter then identifies and discusses the big issues of globalisation, 
climate change, personnel training, and foreign aid and their impacts on policing 
in the Pacific from research participants‟ points of view.  Based on the research 
findings I offer a new approach to international policing in the Pacific.  
Mapping Pacific Policing 
Since 1970, the chiefs of police services of Pacific Island Countries have met and 
discussed policing issues and potential solutions to problems.  The numbers of 
countries engaged in these deliberations grew to twenty-eight in 1993, but was 
reduced to twenty-one with the resignation of Australia‟s state police services in 
2000.  Over the years the chiefs have witnessed big changes in crime and the 
way they deal with it.  They have also noted an increase in the numbers of 
external influences in the region which have resulted in a loss of voice and power 
over their own direction.  Unfortunately, too frequently metropolitan „experts‟ 
impose their standards and methods when asked for advice or intervention, but 
this is not always appropriate for the cultures and societies that ask for help. 
James W.E. Sheptycki‟s typology overview developed at the beginning of the 
new millennium identifying private and public, and high and low policing was 
aimed at securing territory and securing populations.106  This typology no longer 
adequately explains international policing in view of the enormous changes to 
international politics over the first three years of the new millennium.  I consider 
that international policing in 2010 has four key elements: intelligence, that which 
is gathered, collated, analysed, and disseminated in relation to transnational 
organised crime, terrorism and national security; peacemaking as a rapid 
response to internal conflict and the restoration of order, which includes criminal 
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investigation of the instigators of the conflict; state building, establishing 
democracy and democratic policing involving whole of government solutions; and 
capacity building by strategic positioning of international personnel in key 
positions.  These four elements are independent of each other although rapid 
response is usually followed by state building, and the establishment of 
democracy and democratic policing.  There are a further three elements of 
international policing in the current understanding of it: training and targeted 
programmes designed and delivered by bi-lateral or multi-lateral partners; 
emergency management; and liaison and collaboration by individuals in political 
posts across the globe.107  Examples of current practice in the Pacific help explain 
each of the elements and provide the basis for my own approach presented in 
Appendix One.   
Rapid Response 
This generally refers to the response of the international community to conflict 
within states.  Such a response is usually generated by the United Nations on 
receipt of a call for assistance from a country such as occurred for East Timor,108 
but can also, albeit rarely, occur regionally as when Solomon Islands appealed to 
Australia and New Zealand for assistance, first in 2000 and again in 2003.  The 
United Nations was unable provide a mission at the request of PIF or authorise 
the regional response, RAMSI, because of the relationship between Solomon 
Islands and Taiwan.109 
Criminal Investigations 
These are the responsibilities of the police within post-conflict peacekeeping 
missions including the investigation of high level crimes involving deception and 
corruption and violent crime.  Many elites are investigated for their part in civil 
conflict and often convicted and imprisoned, making it more appropriate for 
these investigations to be the responsibility of an impartial international 
community.  For instance, in Solomon Islands large numbers of weapons were 
stolen from police armouries and distributed to rebel fighters, often with the 
assistance of members of the Solomon Islands Police Force who were also 
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members of rebellion forces.110   Many of these were put before the courts after 
lengthy but thorough investigations. 
Criminal investigations into high level criminal activity closely follow initial 
interventions and are required to ensure offenders are brought to justice before 
their communities, contributing to public trust and confidence.  By 2005, RAMSI 
had seized almost 3,600 weapons and made 4,000 arrests.111   
State Building and Establishing Democracy 
Once order has been established following conflict, a mission or intervention is 
designed at the invitation of the country involved in conflict and agreed on by all 
parties.   Long term solutions include whole of government reform designed to 
stimulate economic growth, democratic government, and fair and peaceful 
policing and justice.  These aims are based on international human rights 
standards and education.  An example of this type of state-building in the Pacific 
neighbourhood is the Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI), 
now in its sixth year and involving fifteen countries, all members of the Pacific 
Islands Forum (PIF).  RAMSI has been criticised as an aggressive invasion with 
little if any consultation with the Solomon Islands Government, and even re-
colonisation by Australia and New Zealand.112  However, it has also attracted 
favourable discourse.  State-building and establishing democracy in the 
developing countries of the Pacific must be based on transparent dialogue and 
agreement between the interveners and the host country which must take 
central stage and lead planning for design and implementation. 
Another initiative resulting from rapid response is the Bougainville Community 
Policing Project that is unique in its evolution.  An Australian, Fijian, New 
Zealand and Vanuatuan intervention followed years of struggle for independence 
from Papua New Guinea in 1999, to attempt capacity building from about 2001.  
When Bougainville won autonomy from PNG, the BCPP was established to embed 
a community policing model there.  The Community Auxiliary Police (CAP) was 
successfully established with the support of AusAID and AFP, NZAID and NZP, in 
2001 and so NZP withdrew from the project.  But in 2005, Bougainville police 
became disenchanted with the AFP‟s higher rates of pay and insistence on 
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immunity for their in-country representatives.  Immunity was withdrawn in the 
Supreme Court and more than one hundred and fifty Australian police and 
officials left the country.113  In the vacuum left behind, the government of Papua 
New Guinea approached New Zealand for help.114  In April 2005, New Zealand 
Police returned to Bougainville in partnership at village level to re-establish the 
BCPP and implement a restorative justice system.115 
Capacity Building 
While state building is based on building capacity through the total reform of 
government structures and instruments, capacity building by strategic 
positioning has a different philosophy and is less visible to the communities it 
serves.  It is manifested in policing by the strategic appointment of personnel to 
the position of Chief of Police.  In six Pacific countries116 either New Zealand or 
Australian nationals fill the top police position.  A seventh position held by 
Australian national, Andrew Hughes, as Commissioner of Fiji‟s police service 
followed Speight‟s 2000 coup;117 but what was a warm relationship between the 
military leader, Frank Bainimarama, and Hughes deteriorated from October to 
November 2006 over a shipment of ammunition, 118  which may have been a 
factor in the December 2006 military coup d‟etat.119   
Cook Islands appointed a New Zealand national to the top police job in 2007120 
following a 2006 review which identified poor leadership and management as 
factors in an inefficient police service.121  Nauru appointed its first Australian to 
the Office of Commissioner following a Memorandum of Understanding between 
Australia and Nauru in 2004 which saw Australia taking over responsibility for 
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the offices of finance and police;122  New Zealand Police has provided a person 
for the top Niue police job for most years since 1974.  A localisation policy was 
adopted for some years until a long search with little interest offered up a new 
Commissioner from New Zealand‟s ranks mid-year 2005.123  That Commissioner 
completed almost four years service with a responsibility for a total of fifteen 
staff.  Solomon Islands‟ appointment of key government roles including the 
police commissioner occurred as a part of RAMSI and a number of Australian and 
a New Zealand nationals have filled the top role and deputy roles.124  In July 
2008, Tonga announced the Tonga Police Development Programme, a tripartite 
result of a collaborative assessment carried out the previous year to identify any 
need for change.  This followed riots in the capital, Nuku‟alofa that saw much of 
the central business district destroyed.  The agreement involves funding from 
NZAID and AusAID, and support from New Zealand Police (NZP).  A small 
number of staff from New Zealand Police has been deployed including the 
appointment to Commander of a New Zealand national provided by NZP.125  In 
Tonga, the agreement is built on alignment to the needs of Tongan people with 
ownership by Tonga and building local leadership qualities and skills for the 
future of Tonga Police.126  The sole police position in the Pitcairn Islands, a British 
overseas territory, has also been filled by a New Zealand national 127 since a 
request from the British Government in 2007 opened the way for selection and 
appointment of that post.128  The establishment of the Pitcairn Islands position 
followed investigations of historical sexual offences and the New Zealand officer 
replaced military personnel who had previously acted in the police role.  Each 
deployment, with the exception of Pitcairn Islands, involves an internal top-down 
change model from local models of policing to western democratic domestic 
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policing and has resulted from a plea for help from those countries‟ governments 
as a solution to a break down in trust and confidence.129 
Training and Targeted Programmes 
The capability of police services cannot be increased without training, and 
training as an issue has been an enduring agenda item of the PICP since its first 
conference in 1970, with bilateral training arrangements being a feature of the 
area.130   Historically, training of Pacific police members was carried out by the 
British in Britain which did not meet the needs of Pacific cultures.  While much of 
the later training provided has been well received, some of it, such as forensics, 
is too advanced and unsustainable for police services that do not have the 
basics, such as pens and notebooks, let alone a laboratory to carry out forensics 
testing.131     
Transnational Criminal Intelligence 
Because transnational crime and terrorism pose a real and significant risk to 
regional, national and community safety it is necessary to track the movements 
of known and suspected transnational criminals and commodities.  Interpol has 
been the international face of cooperation between countries on crime and 
criminals since 1923.132  However, it is likely that a Pacific focus has not been a 
top priority at Interpol‟s headquarters. In June 2004 the Pacific Transnational 
Crime Coordination Centre (PTCCC) was established in Fiji to coordinate 
intelligence about transnational crime and criminals in the region.  A number of 
Pacific Island Countries host Transnational Crime Units (TCU) which feed 
information back to the PTCCC.   
Liaison 
Australia has liaison officers in thirty-six posts in more than twenty-seven 
countries, New Zealand has eight in six countries, and China is increasing its 
numbers into western countries.  These are political appointments that provide a 
conduit for dialogue between the governments of host and origin countries, the 
governments and police services of host and origin countries, and a point of first 
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contact for international cooperation.  Liaison officers are often in a position to 
anticipate support, as occurred at the very beginning of the 2004 Boxing Day 
Tsunami in Indonesia and Thailand, where more than 100,000 people perished. 
Having established the range of policing initiatives by external countries, I now 
turn to analysing the participants‟ views on what has happened in the Pacific 
Island states.133 
Issues in Pacific Policing 
Research participants were asked to identify a factor which, for them, had the 
single biggest impact on policing in the Pacific.  They presented a range of views 
with many identifying a number of inter-related factors such as training and 
resources.  But others identified the big issues of globalisation, westernisation 
and climate change as their single biggest impact as verbalised by this 
interviewee: 
It‟s globalisation.  Globalisation is both changing people‟s expectations of 
their quality of life and it‟s also, it‟s shifting people, product, and ideas 
that more rapidly around the world.  In my belief the flow-on effect of 
that, I mean if you could summarise it it‟s just progress really, but it‟s 
accelerated to some extent and enabled by so many different features of 
the modern world that it is creating huge tensions in the ability of police 
agencies to do what they‟ve traditionally done.134 
Globalisation, and tourism as an offshoot of this, has also exposed the isolated 
communities of the Pacific to new tastes in food and goods.  This exposure has 
caused a massive decline in heart and diabetic health in the Pacific as pointed 
out by many respondents:  
People get sick because of the kind of food they eat.  They no longer get 
the food we grew and planted […].  We have got kids eating ice cream or 
anything salty or sweet.  And then you look at the older generation, they 
are all having problems with diabetes.135  
These changes in health and expectations increase financial pressure where a 
move away from traditions has meant a reliance on imported foods and costly 
medical care and medication.  People who do not have the means to buy these 
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necessities are more likely to turn to crime to ease their family‟s pain and 
disease. 
Globalisation is an interesting concept to explore and its qualities shimmer and 
fade depending from which view it is explored. Globalisation has shifted the 
economy from the traditional barter system to a cash economy and with this, 
expectations change and a better quality of life is part of that expectation.  
Exposure to globalisation leads to pressure, discontent and unequal shares in the 
global economy.  Personal expectations of an expanded lifestyle can lead to 
disappointment, anger, and amoral or criminal behaviour when luxury items are 
unaffordable but desirable, creating a further drain on society and policing 
resources: 
The people are moving away from their traditional way of life and 
because of that they found that money is the main source of living rather 
than their own resources. So, we have emerging crime resulting from 
globalisation.  Like gang members, youth members, mainly we have an 
increasing problem resulting from alcohol.  Women in most of the region 
know that sex is a good way to satisfy themselves financially.136   
Even if expectations of a new and luxurious life do not lead to crime, the lure of 
a more exciting and better paid lifestyle in the US, Australia or New Zealand is 
powerful, meaning that young men and women are lost as an island resource.  
But, many return later in life rich in experience and eagerness to contribute to 
traditional island life again.  For many Pacific Island cultures where elder respect 
is part and parcel of life, an older police service with „mana‟ may help secure 
community trust and confidence.   However, it is not only the lure of a perceived 
better life that draws the populace to metropolitan countries.  Global warming 
also creates a need to relocate: 
Global warming is basically the same [as globalisation].  Some of our 
officers are trying to relocate themselves.  They are very good, 
experienced, but we have no choice but to let them go because they have 
to, you know, look after their family, and being from a remote island it‟s 
very difficult for them to make a living on a small salary so they either 
have to go where they can get a better paying job and look after their 
family much better than back home.  So we have a high turnover in 
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personnel because this global warming has affected everyone, especially 
if you‟re from a remote small island.137 
Climate change and sinking islands were discussed by a number of interviewees 
and identified by many as a looming cause of increased crime as the world food 
shortage and high fuel costs result in decreased numbers of deliveries and 
product, turning people towards crime to make a living.  This is particularly 
evident where the isolation of small islands also causes an increase in 
transportation costs and the cost of goods.  Some respondents suggested that 
people will need to return to traditional ways of sustaining life, but that it would 
take a long time to adapt to a life without rice, and canned and fast foods.  I 
surmise that an expectation to revert to a life of traditional self-sufficiency after 
being subjected to a life of instant gratification would also play a part in an 
increased crime problem.    
Respondents also discussed smaller, but still significant, issues that were within 
the power of people to address in a shorter time frame.  Specific training and 
resource issues were uppermost in people‟s minds, but exploration of these 
issues raised more complex factors.  Training has been an enduring agenda item 
since the police chiefs of the South Pacific first met in 1970.  A number of 
potential solutions have been discussed and some have been delivered.  In 
2002, PIF acknowledged the importance of policing as a stabiliser of political 
climate and economic growth and in 2003, the Australian and New Zealand 
prime ministers committed to a joint police training programme that would 
provide standardised police training for Forum Island Countries (FIC) in the 
Pacific. Implemented in 2004, the Pacific Regional Policing Initiative (PRPI) met 
Australia and New Zealand‟s goals for regional and national security and was 
offered in six components.138  The initiative was reviewed towards the end of 
2008, being the end of the five-year commitment.  This coincided with the AFP 
being allocated A$80.1 million during 2008 for policing initiatives in the region, 
and the renaming of the PRPI in December 2008 to the Pacific Policing 
Development Programme (PPDP).139  The new arrangement sheds its previous 
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partnership and dialogue with key regional stakeholder, New Zealand Police, and 
causes some consternation in the region over AFP‟s agenda in the Pacific:140  
I find sometimes there is diplomatic problem with Australia and New 
Zealand; they do have cheque-book diplomacy.  We like to criticise China 
and Taiwan for that, but I think it would be remiss to say New Zealand 
and Australia don‟t have the same approach.  And I think they need to be 
careful, you know, there is disquiet within the Pacific countries about that 
type of approach.141 
The sentiment raised by this interviewee was echoed by most others and 
extended to discuss the reality of metropolitan states providing training to their 
own understanding of policing needs in their own countries without real or 
proper understanding of the receiving country‟s culture and needs.  While many 
acknowledged the value of some of the training given, they also asserted that 
PICs were often not in the situation to sustain or continue the results of it.  This 
was considered essential to ensure that money spent is not simply wasted.    
Some saw that some training in expert areas, like forensics testing, while 
excellent, was also useless to them because they did not have the facilities or 
financial resources to carry out such testing.  Another criticism of training was 
that while there was copious training provided, there was no measurement of 
learning from the training.  Therefore, there was no accountability expected from 
people going on courses and it was almost impossible for managers to gauge 
what had been learnt or how to further develop their people.  Successful and 
appropriate training is reliant on dialogue, two-way communication, needs 
assessments and evaluation of the course itself and of participant learning, 
appropriate design, and recognising that core ownership and focus lies with the 
receiving country not the donor:   
Whatever comes into the Pacific it has to be moulded to fit the Pacific.  If 
it doesn‟t we don't want it.  That‟s my strong belief.142 
From the evidence of the interviews, it was plain that training and resources 
need to be designed to fit the policing model that blends cultural needs with the 
rule of law specific to the country receiving the training, not the needs assumed 
by donor aspirations and plans.    
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Developing ways of working with new partners is a long process that requires 
patience and a real willingness to understand the other.  This can be a difficult 
process in the Pacific where globalisation meets development particularly when 
Pacific peoples appear acquiescent to the demands of more globalised societies: 
Because of the Pacific persona they are very reluctant to criticise, so it‟s 
very difficult and they certainly won‟t do it in a way that looks like it‟s 
going to embarrass or cause any country or agency to lose face. […]  The 
big thing that people from Australia and New Zealand have to realise is 
that they tend to think of their countries as more politically astute 
because they have this power of the economic thing, and that is the 
biggest mistake they can make. 143 
Much was made of the differences in learning methods between the Pacific 
cultures where politics and the ways of the world are passed from elder to infant 
throughout the course of their life in full immersion;144 and western cultures 
which rely on the written word and schooling to teach: 
The people learn politics at their mother‟s knee.  It‟s an immersion 
education in the Pacific where these people are acutely conscious of 
what‟s on offer and what they are expected to deliver up for it.145 
The interviewees also discussed the different ways in which Australia and New 
Zealand work, with many recognising different points of value between Australia 
and New Zealand.  A number of interviewees noticed some tension between the 
two countries in who was doing what, who was responsible for providing the 
most funds or who had the better reputation in the Pacific.  Mostly, respondents 
just wanted both countries to get on with the work and not to bicker about who 
was doing what and whose approach was better: 
And this competition of the AFP that seems to be pre-occupying some 
people.  For me I couldn‟t care less about it.  I‟ve got no problems with 
the AFP.  I‟ve got no problems with the New Zealand Police.  I‟ve got no 
problems with any of them.  But I have got a problem with the 
competition.146 
The bickering aside, there are noticeable differences in the types of policing 
offered by the AFP and NZP, and in the language used in documentation 
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describing their work.  For example, Australia and the AFP insist on advertising 
their „lead‟ role in interventions without acknowledging their partners.  One 
interviewee commented: 
I believe that the Australians believe that how they go about doing 
business is the right way to go about doing business.  You and I might 
look, from the outside looking in and say well, New Zealand is slightly 
different than that.  But I don‟t know that they [AFP] want to beat the 
chiefs into submission and say this is how it‟s going to be.  But that 
might end up being the view.  I don‟t know that‟s actually what they 
intend at all.  But look, everybody knows the Australians and New 
Zealanders work together, they always have in the Pacific.  New 
Zealanders have a great deal of respect, I think, for other Pacific Island 
countries, and Australia has given a lot of aid and assistance, but they 
work differently.147 
Respondents also noted that the AFP was strictly involved in and appeared to be 
only interested in transnational crime and intelligence gathering, and that NZP 
was more involved in building capacity through a community policing model.  
While the AFP has established a number of Transnational Crime Units across 
Pacific Islands Forum countries employing local staff, who are supported and 
mentored by AFP representatives in those countries, 148  New Zealand has 
implemented, among other things, the Pacific Prevention of Domestic Violence 
Programme (PPDVP), a tripartite agreement and fully collaborative arrangement 
between New Zealand Aid (NZAID) New Zealand Police (NZP) and the Pacific 
Islands Chiefs of Police (PICP).  The programme is not limited to Forum Island 
countries but is available to all PICP member countries.   While the PPDVP 
programme is welcomed as a complete partnership, the spread of the TCUs has 
caused some tension between Australia and New Zealand, and also some PICs: 
While the TCUs have been supported, we know that New Zealand police 
aren‟t part of the TCU, so obviously there‟s some underground tension 
there as to why they‟re not, and they‟re likely seeing what the ultimate 
objective of having these TCUs is, so I guess in a nutshell I‟d say that I 
think it‟s good that they‟re there, but I think there needs to be some 
more transparency about, you know, what their final objective is.  
Because I don‟t believe it‟s all about just providing for the Pacific Islands, 
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you know, Australia and New Zealand actually don‟t have that approach.  
There‟s obviously a requirement for something to be given back and, it is 
yet to be seen what that actually is.149 
These differences stimulated discussion during the interviews about how well 
each of the metropolitan countries mandates fitted the needs of building police 
capacity in the Pacific.  Many respondents thought that the AFP „wanted to put 
their footprint over everything‟, only brought its own international and 
intelligence mandate to the PICP table, and did not fairly represent the value 
offered in domestic and community policing by Australia‟s other police services.  
When discussing the PICP and the AFP the majority of respondents thought that 
the views of the Australian state and territory police, rather than the AFP, were 
valuable because they better reflected the type of policing that was carried out in 
PICs.  But even though this was so, most respondents felt that the inclusion of 
all the Chiefs of Australia‟s state and territory services as members of the PICP, 
would result in the drowning of their own voices; therefore, this was not an 
option.  There was also some acknowledgement that the AFP was making some 
improvements by swearing in selected members from state and territory police 
as AFP members, for specific field tenures and this was changing the flavour, to 
some degree, of the AFP in Pacific postings.  Some participants suggested one or 
two state representatives could accompany the AFP delegate to the PICP 
conference, such as occurs from the Federated States of Micronesia which also 
has state and federal policing.  Another suggestion was that a meeting of AFP 
and all Australian state and territory police to discuss issues and representation 
could be held just prior to the PICP conference, although there was concern that 
contributions from the states and territories may not be put forward at 
conference.  Even though there was lively discussion about Australia and New 
Zealand, it was generally agreed that both countries were important to the 
future of policing in the Pacific, but perhaps with a little more „distance‟ than 
they currently enjoy. 
The vigorous discussions about Australia and New Zealand overshadowed, to a 
degree, interviewees‟ views on the other important influences on the region.  
However, the discussions identified perhaps the biggest factor impacting on the 
region.  This was the problem of aid.  The region has one of the lowest GDPPC in 
the world, creating an attractive vessel into which OECD countries eager to 
parade their responsible international citizen‟s badge can flood copious amounts 
of dollars, pounds, euros, yen and Chinese yuan.  
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There is an enormous amount of aid specifically targeted to the Pacific.  Much of 
it is earmarked for social and economic development and some of it finds its way 
to the police services within the region.  Research participants were asked a 
series of questions about donor funding, any perceived power imbalances 
between donor and receiver, and the differing expectations between donors who 
are members of Pacific regional organisations including France, Australia and 
New Zealand, and those of countries from outside this framework such as China, 
Taiwan, the United States and the European Union.  Many agreed there were 
demands of accountability in relation to the use of funds particularly from 
Australia and New Zealand because of their own interests in regional and 
national security, whereas the EU was fairly benign and China and Taiwan were 
different again.150  
Some interviewees observed that it was easy to get money from China and 
Taiwan and the arrangements about its use were fairly flexible.  Additionally, 
there was no monitoring of expenditure, which was different from Australia and 
New Zealand who wanted to know a great deal about how the money was used 
and how much was needed.  These two countries also wanted to evaluate the 
success or otherwise of its use,151 enabling donors to assess the usefulness and 
success of specific programmes and projects.  Particular problems can arise 
when projects are partially funded by more than one country as occurred when 
Australia refused to allow some staff to attend an opening ceremony and put in 
writing to the host country to “reconsider receiving funding from the source of 
this country”.152  
Many participants described the receipt of funds as a necessity without which 
they could not provide services of a high standard to their citizens or keep their 
societies safe. 153  Others saw the amount of funding as a disadvantage that 
caused a „benefit mentality‟ in many parts of the Pacific.154 One participant had 
this to say: 
There has to be a change of mindset from the Pacific Island nations […] 
the first thing they say is “how can we get aid on this?  How can we get 
it?”  The first thing I say is, “how can we do it ourselves?  What do we 
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need help with?”  In my [country] it is chronic.  And if everything 
collapses they know that somebody will come to their rescue.155  
Another theme arising from discussion about donations and funding was that on 
many occasions the criteria set by donors did not match the needs of the 
receiver.  For example, some of those interviewed discussed the millions of 
dollars being spent on new police buildings which would boost morale among the 
staff, but they still needed funds for basic personnel development and resources 
which were more difficult to come by.156  There were also comments on the need 
to ensure the results of donations were sustainable.  For example, one 
participant spoke of receiving motor vehicles from Taiwan only to discover that 
spare parts were at additional cost and had to be sourced from Taiwan, and once 
vehicles were no longer usable there would be no replacements. 157    Many 
agreed that whatever funding was provided it had to be done in a way that the 
outcomes from it could be sustained and would provide benefits for the 
country.158   It was claimed that many of the services carried out in country were 
provided by personnel contracted by the aid donor and that perhaps only thirty 
percent of the aid money stayed in country whilst the other seventy percent 
returned to the country of origin. 159    Not only does this practice belie the 
messages of aid by donor countries, it also hampers the development of skills in 
the receiving country and contributes to crime, as discussed earlier.  In addition 
to this, donor countries benefit from increased power through the ability to force 
decisions which benefit their own agenda, and this has not gone unnoticed by 
Pacific populations as pointed out by this interviewee: 
Those with a higher population, the wealthier, the wealthiest countries 
are taking more powers in the decision-making, in my personal view, 
because they are providing us with resource.160 
Unequal power breeds resentment and that, in turn, frustrates western ideas of 
progress which typically want to „sprint things along‟.   
New Zealand and Australia broadly agree on the type of assistance meted out to 
police services in the Pacific.  Overall, they both see the implantation of 
democracy and western styled democratic policing as the solution.  This involves 
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a „whole-of-government‟ reform strategy as seen in the aggressive Regional 
Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI).  Although RAMSI was planned 
at the regional level utilising the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF), a tactic designed to 
deflect accusations of neo-colonialism by Australia, there was no partnership in 
developing solutions, with the Solomon Islands government.161  The intervention 
involved two thousand two hundred and twenty-five military and police 
personnel from six countries. 162   The RAMSI example, the demands for 
accountability and monitoring, and the numbers of expatriate New Zealand and 
Australian personnel placed in strategic police positions contribute to the 
perception of a power imbalance across the region.  But such a perception can 
be eliminated through the willingness of metropolitan and donor minds to meet 
and actively listen to Pacific voices and to alter policies and practices 
accordingly. 
Along with the perception of a power imbalance there was discussion by a 
number of respondents about a mismatch between colonial models of 
governance and traditional leadership, particularly in the area of knowledge and 
expertise in colonial models of public service.  Attempts have been made in 
some countries to decentralise government, giving the power of governance 
back to tribal leaders but the complications faced were explained by this 
participant:  
After de-colonisation, Britain pulled out and we became independent, but 
we still had all the British structures […] which are centralised here with 
the government, but the new government decentralised governance 
substantially to some local leaders.  We faced a lot of problems in that 
transition.  It is good in a way because the traditional leaders are given 
power, but most often they work outside those powers simply because 
they don‟t understand, they don‟t have that knowledge [of British models 
of government].  Government officials have tried to explain but the 
leaders are changed from time to time and so they always lack the 
knowledge and understanding of how to work together with the central 
government.  The police are caught in the middle of it.163  
This discussion clearly demonstrates issues connected with advancing models of 
governance suitable and appropriate for recently independent societies.  Some 
recognised advantages of colonisation, Christianity and government agencies 
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that had provided a shift away from a more customary way of life.  Although it 
was universally agreed that there was no going back, many participants strongly 
stated there was much work to be done in aligning western models with 
traditional ones and that metropolitan powers must listen more to the needs and 
voices of the Pacific: 
It depends on those big countries.  To improve this they have to work on 
dialogues and have not only a meeting but they have to expose 
themselves to our local environments, to see how well we go about with 
the people, what the customs are all about, whether there‟s political and 
social [customs].  [In] my personal view, I prefer a meeting […] in that 
local environment, because they expose themselves to the heart of the 
country.164 
Exposing donors to the heart of the country, its culture and resources seems like 
a simple solution, but along with exposure must also come understanding.  
There is no point in exposing donors to a situation if they consider the host‟s 
culture inferior or in need of meeting unrealistic western standards; or, if they 
don‟t understand it well enough to form real partnerships that will develop 
meaningful and collegial progress.    
In addition to observations about a lack of attention to cultural matters and a 
willingness for both parties to meet somewhere in the middle, the AFP and NZP 
as members of the PICP as well as being donors and training providers, have a 
conflict of interest and a vested interest in the future of policing in the Pacific. A 
number of respondents saw a solution to this through a more assertive role for 
the Pacific Islands Chiefs of Police, a more involved role for their Secretariat and 
advisory roles only for AFP and NZP, rather than membership.  An interviewee 
explained: 
Ownership of policing standards and aid initiatives need to be seized by 
Pacific Islands‟ members of PICP to develop their own process, not to be 
dictated to by donor countries.  This requires good practice and 
ownership which requires strong leadership – it is crucial for the Pacific 
Islands members to take control of their own processes.  The Pacific 
Islands‟ chiefs need to lead while other members should sit outside as 
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supporters.  PICP-S has a crucial role to play, to be an action body in 
taking objective coordination of this process.165 
Building on the seven key types of involvement in international policing, I now 
go on to propose a new approach to international policing in the Pacific which 
makes use of the insights gained from the interviews.  This approach is designed 
to meet the needs of the developing countries of the Pacific region and, also of 
the donor countries. 
Towards a New Approach 
State building and capacity building are two important and encompassing points 
where international policing meets domestic policing and it is essential that 
intervening personnel understand their host‟s needs and customs.  I emphasise 
these meeting point this is where I think the greatest improvements can be 
made to communication, understanding and models of policing which will ensure 
interventions are appropriate to culture and country while also meeting the 
security and human rights needs of the international community.   
My approach is based on the idea of community safety and defines community 
as those people socially and or politically bound by common interests; it can be 
as small as the smallest rural district or village within a country, or the wider 
community of a group of nations such as found in Polynesia, Melanesia, 
Micronesia, the Pacific, or within a group like the PICP.  Likewise the approach is 
based on the idea that safety and security are interchangeable and therefore 
encompass personal, national and international security.  In comparison to 
Sheptyicki‟s earlier typology, I suggest that if territory is not secure then it is 
plausible to assume that the territory‟s population is likewise not safe.  This 
argument then, finds the concept of policing for community safety a solid and 
encompassing base that guides our understanding of policing in the international 
and domestic realms.  Furthermore, the basis of community safety must be 
supported by a range of values and principles that ensure all police staff, 
national and international, are transparent and accountable in their work.  The 
approach also offers a brief overview of nine basic individual elements that make 
up modern western policing systems.  The principles of each of the elements are 
transferable in whole to any police jurisdiction, whether singly, in pairs or in total 
– but it is the content and methods of each element that must be appropriately 
designed to suit the rule of law and customs of the country adopting the model.  
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If genuine attention is paid to this task the vision of the research participants is 
achievable: 
The Pacific can sustain itself, it won‟t rely on outside people, each 
country will have its own style if you like. So each country has its own 
style and culture, but there is actually a regional awareness of the need 
to share information, to have similar sorts of protocols, so you can 
extradite people, and interview criminals in other countries, to have a 
bit of cooperation, because the countries are too small on their own to 
do that.  So there needs to be more cooperation, and Pacific Islands‟ 
police would get more reliant on each other rather than turning to the 
bigger players every time.166 
However, this vision can only become a reality if all sectors of government work 
together collegially, taking into account the effects of one sector on the others 
and designing solutions that balance policing, justice, health and education.   
Summary 
Policing forms a crucial national security role in the Pacific not only for the Pacific 
Island Countries lying within it, but also for a growing number of large 
metropolitan countries who not only consider national security among their 
interests, but also the rich bounty of resources in the region and various 
diplomatic benefits.  The Pacific Islands Chiefs of Police have met as a group 
since 1970 to discuss issues such as training, resources and terrorism.  Research 
participants identified a vision for policing in the region that included self-control 
of their police services in accord with the spirit and principles of the rule of law, 
good governance and access to justice, while respecting local indigenous cultures 
and identities, and human rights. 
A number of issues need to be addressed before this vision can succeed: an 
overwhelming interest in the region from a number of metropolitan and large 
countries with a range of agendas; a hangover of colonial models of governance 
that are culturally inappropriate and cumbersome, and expensive to maintain; 
globalised wealthy western states clashing with the emerging economies of 
unique once self-sufficient societies; and an inflow of billions of dollars, euros, 
yen and yuan accompanied by varying levels of accountability. 
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According to interviewees, globalisation has had the biggest influence on the 
region through changes in expectations of self-improvement, resulting in an 
explosion of heart disease and diabetes, one factor in an increasing crime 
problem, an increase in amoral behaviour and or crime, and migration.   Tourism 
as an offshoot of globalisation exposes populations to western disposable 
incomes and this also causes crime against tourists through desire for 
unaffordable consumer goods.  Climate change is also a factor in forcing 
migration and increased crime.  Smaller solvable issues include training, but this 
point raised further complexities including a spat between Australia and New 
Zealand about who did things better in the Pacific; cheque-book diplomacy of 
China Taiwan, Australia and New Zealand; and, a perception of a power 
imbalance across the region which related to the power of those holding the 
funds over those who needed them.  The power imbalance resulted in training 
programmes for Pacific policing that were decided by the providing body but 
often did not match what was actually needed or were not sustainable.      
Assumptions about the peoples, cultures and politics of the Pacific made by 
outsiders are often out of touch with reality.  The cultures of the Pacific teach 
their young through spoken language and story-telling from birth.  They are very 
astute in the ways of the world and what they have to give up, but outsiders 
tended to think that because Pacific peoples do not complain or loudly argue, 
that they acquiesce to the demands of the wealthy; but a reluctance of Pacific 
peoples to criticise or embarrass often leads to exploitation. 
Aid to the region raises even more complex issues and differing expectations 
from each of the states and bodies providing funds.  Funds often do not meet 
the needs of the receiving country.  The day-to-day resources needed to carry 
out their work are overlooked for more flamboyant testaments to assistance.  
Others require very high levels of accountability and transparency in the use of 
funds.  Interviewees were almost unanimous in voicing that external funding 
organisations needed to be exposed to the „heart of the country‟ before coming 
to them to discuss and dialogue what was needed, and that those funding 
organisations need to listen and help in designing interventions that fit with the 
customs of the country.  
It was noted that the AFP and New Zealand have a conflict of interest in being 
members of the PICP as well as major funding providers of policing.  A solution 
offered was to transition to advisory positions to the PICP rather than act as 
decision makers and members.  This is in harmony with good development 
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theory that encourages handing over the „stick‟ of power to the less powerful, 
empowering them to make their own decisions.167 
An understanding of Pacific Policing has been provided by an overview of the 
various types and examples of policing currently undertaken in the Pacific.  
These include intelligence such as that offered by Interpol, the PTCCC and TCUs; 
peace-making missions either by the UN or the regional mission RAMSI which 
include the investigation of high level criminal offences; state building; capacity 
building; training; emergency management; and liaison.  
State-building and capacity-building are two areas where international policing 
meets domestic policing and it is these areas that provide a number of 
opportunities to satisfy cultural needs as well as the security needs of external 
providers.  A new approach to pacific policing is offered that concentrates on 
collaborative processes.   
Conclusion 
This chapter has revealed a number of complex problems involved in 
international policing in the Pacific.  It seems clear that Australia and New 
Zealand are committed to continuing their work in policing in the Pacific; 
however, they must be mindful that the peoples of the Pacific do not have the 
benefit of more than a hundred years experience in independence or 
sovereignty.  This disadvantage places Pacific Islands‟ cultures and peoples in a 
vulnerable position therefore, although Pacific leaders acknowledge the need for 
assistance from external providers, the way forward must heed the voices of the 
Pacific.  This will occur if Australia and New Zealand cease their bickering about 
who has the most money or who works better, recognise each other‟s strengths, 
and focus on working side-by-side.  They should both step back from their active 
board roles and take on consultative ones instead, joining with other fund 
providers to assess and plan for sustainable policing practices in the Pacific. 
There are a number of well established organisations in the Pacific which have 
relevant expertise, knowledge and local respect and are featured in Chapter 4. 
These organisations should be at the forefront of future planning. 
It is also apparent that Pacific leaders and decision makers need to change the 
Pacific Way from one of acquiescence to that of assertive leadership to ensure 
ownership of the way forward.   
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CHAPTER FOUR: Regional Cooperation and 
Dynamics 
Policing in the Pacific has been regionalised since the Chiefs of Police from seven 
South Pacific police jurisdictions met in 1970 to discuss issues facing them.  This 
offered an opportunity for all of the isolated jurisdictions of the Pacific to discuss 
common problems and plan solutions together, to learn and glean knowledge 
from the more experienced.  At the first meeting it was important for the chair, 
His Excellency the Governor General of Fiji, Sir Robert Foster, to state that 
attendance and discussion should not be, in any way, limited by the 
constitutional status of any of the Pacific island nations.  The importance of this 
qualification became more obvious in later years when some annoyance was 
displayed by the Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat (PIFS) in dismissing the 
importance of the larger membership of the PICP.  However, the question of 
membership is also linked to regional kinship as can be seen in the trust and 
acceptability afforded the Pacific Community, which has the largest membership 
of all Pacific organisations.  This is important in a region which values its culture 
and fights to retain it while progressing towards globalisation.   
The main focus of this chapter as viewed through the internal lens is the 
collaboration and cooperation between organisations within the Pacific region 
with a special emphasis on law enforcement, encompassing police, customs and 
immigration.  A number of organisations are examined, in order of their age, 
beginning with the South Pacific Community (SPC), which was established in 
1947 and is now known simply as the Pacific Community,168 and ending with a 
brief overview of sub-regional policing bodies.    The bulk of those in the middle 
have been included for their links to law enforcement (including police, customs 
and immigration), regional politics (through the Pacific Islands Forum, APEC, 
ASEAN and ARF), and civil society.  In this section I focus on the backgrounds, 
functions, corporate plans, governance and funding of each organisation.  This 
discussion is followed by analysis based on interview data about cooperation and 
collaboration, vertically and horizontally, among organisations.  Particular 
questions raised involve communication and coordination, the tyranny of 
distance, language, the Pacific Way, and perceptions of power.   The discussion 
also identifies areas of contention which have been more closely analysed in 
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Chapter Three.   A summary of the discussion and analysis completes the 
chapter. 
The Pacific Community 
The South Pacific Commission (SPC) 169  was formed in 1947 by the six 
governments with territorial interests in the Pacific – Australia, New Zealand, the 
United Kingdom, France, the United States of America, and the Netherlands 
through the Canberra Agreement (1947).170   The SPC was a direct outcome of 
the ANZAC Pact, an agreement between Australia and New Zealand made in 
Canberra and brought into force 1 February 1944, to ensure post-war Australian 
security interests were regionally focussed and driven in concert by Australia and 
New Zealand.171   
Article 30 of the ANZAC Pact referred to the establishment of a regional 
organisation which would have advisory powers and a suggested name of the 
South Seas Regional Commission.  The possibility of including „accredited 
representatives‟ from the United Kingdom, the United States of America and 
France were raised in Article 30, but only as a possibility, not as a foregone 
conclusion.172    The agreed broad function of the future organisation was to 
develop and establish common social, economic, and political development policy 
targeted at improving and advancing the well-being of „the native peoples 
themselves‟.173  At the forefront of the detailed functions of the organisation as 
set out in Article 31 (a) was a recommendation that indigenous peoples be 
increasingly introduced to administrative roles in preparation for self-government 
of a form most suited to those indigenous populations.174   Article 31 (b) to (e) 
expected the regional organisation to recommend arrangements for material 
development, coordination of health and medical services and education, 
maintenance and improvement of labour conditions and social services, as well 
as collaboration in economic, social, medical and anthropological research.  
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Article 31 (f) suggested the organisation would make and publish periodical 
reviews of progress in relation to the previous five functions.175   
Three years later on 6 February 1947, six metropolitan states176 convened, again 
in Canberra, to agree on and bring into force the Establishment of the South 
Pacific Commission.177  Territorial scope is contained in Article II, which limits 
representation to only non-self-governing territories and clearly sets 
geographical boundaries to include all territories administered by the 
participating governments which lie (wholly or in part) in the Pacific Ocean but 
south of the Equator and east from and including Netherlands New Guinea.178  
This scope was amended in November 1951, to include Guam and the Trust 
Territories of Pacific Islands which lie north of the Equator.179  The territorial 
scope was further amended in 1964 to include representation of the first 
independent state, Western Samoa, and the potential inclusion of an increasing 
number of independent states.180  An additional amendment in 1964 involved the 
withdrawal of the Netherlands181 as a result of handing over Netherlands New 
Guinea to Indonesia in 1962, effecting the removal of almost three quarters of a 
million people from the Pacific region and placing them within Indonesia.182  The 
United Kingdom withdrew in 1996 and rejoined in 1998, but then withdrew again 
in 2005.183 
Further amendments to the founding document occurred in 1974, 1976, 1983, 
1996 and in 1997 the name of the South Pacific Commission was changed to the 
Pacific Community.  In 1999 the Declaration de Tahiti Nui was written to 
eliminate the cumbersome processes required to make changes to the Canberra 
Agreement (1947) and embodies the operational policies of the Pacific 
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Community.  This living document is updated as required by the governing body, 
the South Pacific Conference.184 
The founding document and subsequent amendments established the SPC as a 
„consultative and advisory body to the participating Governments‟ with a strong 
research focus.  It was also to make recommendations and provide coordination 
of services to develop economics, social rights and welfare of the people in the 
region,   particularly in „agriculture, communications, transport, fisheries, 
forestry, industry, labour, marketing, production, trade and finance, public 
works, education, health, housing and social welfare‟.185 
Noticeably absent from the agreement was any reference to political 
development and the advancement of indigenous self-governance, having been 
ruled out by conservative European governments particularly against Australia, 
who argued strongly in favour of self-governance, and New Zealand.186  The 
significance of this omission was highlighted during the 1970s when members of 
the Pacific Islands Producers Association (PIPA) became disenchanted with SPC‟s 
refusal to act in relation to the issues of nuclear testing at Mururoa Atoll and 
Kanak suppression in New Caledonia. 187   This disenchantment became a 
successful push for the establishment of a politically assertive regional 
organisation, the future South Pacific Forum.188 
As a result of pressure to reform by member countries and the South Pacific 
Forum‟s initiative in establishing a regional coordination body, the SPC instigated 
independent external reviews in 1996, 2001 and 2005.  The draft Declaration de 
Tahiti Nui (1999), 189  reaffirms SPC‟s apolitical nature and its mandate to 
„undertake research, technical assistance and training in support of the economic 
and social development of the region‟s twenty-two Pacific Island Countries and 
Territories‟. The Declaration recognises and emphasises that the work of the SPC 
should complement that of other regional organisations and avoid overlap or 
infringement of other agencies‟ roles in the region. Section 43 clearly states a 
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necessary and desired inter-organisational relationship-building and cooperation 
stance at a regional and international level.190   
The functions of the SPC remain true to the original document, but an external 
review of the organisation in 2005 is reflected in the Corporate Plan to 2012.  
Whilst recognising the three major focus areas of the SPC, the current Corporate 
Plan has new emphases on an increased focus on member priorities, strategic 
engagement at national, regional and international levels, and enhancing SPC‟s 
public profile and strategic positioning.191   The SPC‟s challenge is to become 
more proactive in monitoring and analysing developments relevant to its 
member countries and territories.  It will develop individual country strategies 
across the region and devolve its staff to position itself as a hands-on, on-the-
spot organisation capable of responding to in-country needs promptly and 
proactively.  It will ensure its programmes, currently based in Land, Marine and 
Social resources, complement other national and regional programmes to a 
greater extent than in the past.192   
A constant theme running through the Declaration de Tahiti Nui (2000) and 
Corporate Plan 2007-2012, is that of collegial working partnerships with open 
and frequent communication to ensure the development of economies, health 
and social aspects of the peoples of the Pacific Islands.193 
The SPC is governed by the Conference of the Pacific Community.194  This body, 
comprising Ministers of Foreign Affairs or equivalent, meets every two years and 
delegates its authority to make decisions to the Committee of Representatives of 
Governments and Administrations (CRGA) to provide a mechanism to advance 
issues between Conference years.195  Each of the twenty-six member countries 
and territories has one vote although decisions are only put to a vote where the 
Pacific Way of Consensus cannot be reached through a concerted effort of 
conversation and discussion.196 
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The Conference of the Pacific Community and CRGA are supported by the 
Secretariat of the Pacific Community (SPC) which has its head office in Noumea, 
New Caledonia, one in Suva, Fiji and another recently opened office in Pohnpei, 
Federated States of Micronesia.  The SPC is legally an international organisation 
managed by an Executive Director who in 2007 was responsible for 
approximately 350 staff.197 
Figure 1 – SPC Donors198 
Donor Countries 
Australia France European Union Germany 
Japan New Zealand Taiwan United States 
Land Programmes 
Australian Centre 
for International 
Agricultural 
Research (ACIAR) 
Food and 
Agriculture 
Organisation 
(FAO) 
International 
Plant Genetic 
Resources 
Institute (IPGRI) 
United Nations 
Development 
Programme 
(UNDP) 
Marine Programmes Asian 
Development 
Bank (ADB) 
Global 
Environment 
Facility (GEF) 
International 
Maritime 
Organisation 
(IMO) 
MacArthur 
Foundation 
Packard 
Foundation 
Social Programmes  Commonwealth 
Secretariat 
Centres for 
Disease Control 
and Prevention 
(Atlanta) (CDC) 
United Nations 
Educational, 
Scientific and 
Cultural 
Organisation 
(UNESCO) 
United Nations 
Population Fund 
(UNFPA) 
World Health 
Organisation 
(WHO) 
 
In 2007 the SPC had an annual budget of approximately US$48 million that is 
split between core (US$35 million) and non-core (US$8.5 million) functions.199  
New challenges for human resources, corporate services and programme support 
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services require a concerted effort to attract new funds realisation to relieve 
pressure on what is described as a static fund.200  [See Figure 1]  
Pacific Islands Chiefs of Police (PICP) 
The Pacific Islands Chiefs of Police (PICP) was established in 1970 as the South 
Pacific Chiefs of Police Conference (SPCPC).  The seven founding members201 
met to discuss policing issues and ways of collaborating to ensure the best use of 
limited financial resources allocated to policing by governments.202  Membership 
grew to twenty-eight members by 1993 203  and included all Pacific Island 
Countries and territories with the exception of Wallis and Futuna, Tokelau, 
Pitcairn Islands, Norfolk Island, Rapanui and Hawaii, but including New Zealand 
and Australia.  A clear comment made at the first conference by Sir Robert 
Foster, Fiji‟s Governor, was that the constitutional arrangements of South Pacific 
Island nations would not limit discussions between members of the policing 
fraternity of the South Pacific.204  This philosophy set the political boundaries of 
the SPCPC and was in keeping with the South Pacific Commission but not with 
the South Pacific Forum which followed a year later.205 
The SPCPC grew exponentially however, and by 2000 countries represented by 
more than one police service were required to relinquish seats of individual state 
services in favour of their Federal police services which would represent all police 
jurisdictions in their country.  This brought the membership back to the current 
twenty-one members.206   The name of the organisation was changed in March 
2005 to reflect that membership had outgrown the South Pacific with member 
countries from both Micronesia and Melanesia. 
The PICP represents approximately 85,750 serving police staff and it also holds a 
seat on the International Association of Police Chiefs (IACP). [See Appendix Two, 
Table 1] 
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One of the functions of the PICP has been to discuss issues as they related to 
police jurisdictions across the Pacific.  Many of the agenda items generated 
collaboration in training and the provision of equipment, but many of the items 
returned for discussion in successive agendas.  As the political climate changed 
over the years, many of the agenda items increased in seriousness, particularly 
in the areas of terrorism, drugs and transnational crime, and offences relating to 
fishing.  The nature of the Pacific and its reliance on its fishing industry indicates 
that the latter offences would be exceedingly important to the economy of the 
region. The terrorist events in New York and Washington DC in September 2001 
and in Bali in October 2002 increased the emphasis on transnational crime and 
terrorism.  Around this time the UN also sharpened its focus on human rights, 
placing additional pressure on developing countries to address issues such as 
HIV/AIDS and poverty.  These growing issues and concerns stimulated the PICP 
Secretariat to increase staff numbers to address them.   
New Zealand Police (NZP) provided a high-ranking member of NZP who acted as 
a secretariat, organising matters relating to the annual conference from 1976.  
This role was carried out as part of his day-to-day duties.  Over the years the 
Chiefs regularly questioned the role of the organisation itself and that of its 
secretariat.  A number of formal internal reviews confirmed that the role of the 
secretariat was to complete tasks as set by the Chiefs at the annual Conference 
and to ensure the conference was organised.  However, in 2004/2005 another 
internal review of the PICP and Secretariat resulted in an expansion of the 
secretariat‟s role and increase in staff to run a growing number of projects 
around HIV/AIDS, Use of Force, Patrol Boats and Peace Keeping.  A further 
internal review of the Secretariat in 2007/2008 was conducted by AFP, NZP and 
Palau Police to assess the capabilities and the capacity of the PICP Secretariat to 
develop and deliver the “Future Directions in Pacific Policing” programme of 
work.207 
The Future Directions in Pacific Policing paper of 2007 highlights the three pillars 
of Ethics and Integrity, Regional Policing Capacity Development and Regional 
Cooperation.208   The overall objective of the strategy is to place police in a 
central role in the region which is respected for its governance, democratic 
values and human rights.  The overarching goal of the strategy is: 
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To improve the value of policing in the Pacific and shift the focus from a 
cost to government to an investment in the safety and security of 
community, country and region.209    
The strategy requires country by country dialogue to assess needs and develop 
specific plans for implementation which will include significant investment in staff 
training and development, new buildings and equipment in a number of 
locations, and improvements to governance and administration frameworks.  The 
Chiefs‟ wishes and intentions to raise the profile and professionalism of policing 
in the Pacific are reflected in the FDIPP paper which will critically inform the PICP 
strategy to 2014.210   
The PICP is governed by a Constitution that was last revised and consolidated at 
the Annual Meeting of 2005.  The Constitution encapsulates the name, mission 
statement and rules about how the organisation and its secretariat is organised 
and run.  Article II contains information about the territorial borders of 
membership which are very broadly described as „in the region of the Pacific 
Islands‟, meaning that any island country within the Pacific Ocean could apply for 
membership.211  Article II, S.3 allocated one vote per member country for any 
matter or issue with decisions carried on a two-thirds majority vote.212  This 
process departs from the usual decision making method for Pacific regional 
organisations of the “Pacific Way of Consensus”.  Meetings follow the general 
“Robert‟s Rules of Order”.213  Although the Secretariat is mentioned in passing 
within various parts of the document, it does not specify any rules or purpose for 
it apart from those pertaining to the responsibilities of the Executive Director in 
heading the secretariat, reporting on its regular business at the annual meeting, 
and the responsibilities of a custodial and caring nature regarding the PICP 
funds. 
The PICP and its Secretariat have been reviewed constantly over the life of the 
organisation.  Some of these reviews have been formally carried out by an 
internal review team whilst others have been ad hoc.  Most have been generated 
by the AFP who also form part of the review team along with NZP and another 
Pacific Island country representative.  Whilst the generosity of time and 
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resources from the metropolitan states is commendable, this process of internal 
review is biased and weighted towards the powerful, with questionable 
transparency. 
The PICP is serviced by a Secretariat which is housed in New Zealand at Police 
National Headquarters.  Funds to administer the secretariat and provide salaries 
and project funding, including development funds for women in policing, and the 
travel fund are provided by New Zealand Police (NZP), Australian Federal Police 
(AFP), NZAID, AusAID, UNAID and France.  AFP makes provision for two to three 
short term project officers to be sourced from the Pacific, and a Project Manager 
with the additional role of AFP liaison in New Zealand.  This combination of roles 
also raises questions about a conflict of interest for the AFP, and transparency.  
The annual PICP budget is in the region of NZ$1.6 million.214  
The SPCPC established the South Pacific Islands Criminal Intelligence Network 
(SPICIN) in 1987 during its Conference in response to a need for police 
jurisdictions to share information about criminals and criminal movements 
throughout the region.  The terms of reference for this arrangement were 
captured in a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU).  The purpose of the 
network was to provide a central repository, analytical expertise, coordination of 
cross country investigations, and training in related matters.215 
Although the PICP no longer claims any formal tie with SPICIN, SPICIN still 
implies links to the SPCPC through its website.216  In 2003 the PICP resolved to 
transfer governance of SPICIN to the government of American Samoa and the 
SPICIN Policy Board which had previously governed the organisation was 
dissolved.  At this point the PICP pledged unanimous support for the newly 
established PTCCC which is discussed in more depth later in this chapter. 
The first conference of the PICP - Women‟s Advisory Network (PICP-WAN) was 
held in 2004 in Fiji.  The purpose of the group is to discuss issues facing women 
in police across the region and to report these to the Chiefs at their annual 
Conference.217  This initiative follows a focus on human rights and the inclusion 
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of gender equality in a number of strategic plans in the region and is 
administered by the PICP.218   
The PICP-WAN meets annually and actively endeavours to increase the 
knowledge base of women in policing by welcoming a delegation of two women 
from each PICP member country, one who has attended the conference in a 
previous year, and the other being a new initiate.  The following year the new 
initiate becomes the experienced delegate and a new delegate is selected to 
accompany the experienced one.  The 2008 Conference also identified a model 
to ensure impetus gained through the Conference was maintained throughout 
the year „in-country‟.219 
Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) 
The Pacific Islands Forum grew from the establishment of a group of newly 
independent ex British Commonwealth Pacific Island Countries in the 1960s to 
actively build trading markets in New Zealand for their produce.  The group, 
Pacific Islands Producers Association (PIPA), had previously approached the SPC 
with two agenda items in 1970.  The first was to stop France testing nuclear 
bombs at Mururoa Atoll,220 and the second was to develop a regional political 
programme.  Both of these items were firmly rejected by France and the US.221   
The PIPA member states turned their attention to New Zealand in 1971 in a bid 
for her to host a meeting of the heads of independent and self-governing Pacific 
Island Countries and Australia. This meeting was hailed a success, however the 
increased political and wider regional focus was not reflected in PIPA as a name, 
and at the Australian hosted meeting in February 1972 the South Pacific Forum 
(SPF) was established as a regional political entity.222   
The SPF actively opposed France‟s stand on nuclear testing at Mururoa Atoll and 
was responsible for establishing the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone (SPNFZ) 
through the Treaty of Rarotonga of 1985.  It also opposed France‟s denial of self-
determination for the Kanak population in New Caledonia, resulting in New 
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Caledonia‟s inclusion on the United Nations list of non-self-governing 
territories.223  This pressure led to the Matignon (1988) and Noumea (1998) 
Accords, which may eventually lead to New Caledonia‟s independence.224 
The establishment and success of the South Pacific Forum gave its members the 
impetus to lobby for a single regional organisation (SRO) to replace the SPC with 
a more forward looking organisation after efforts in 1970 to force reform on the 
SPC failed.  The South Pacific Bureau for Economic Cooperation (SPEC), an 
intergovernmental arm of the SPF, was reasonably successful for about ten 
years, but eventually the all inclusiveness of the SPC was more favourable to the 
shared background of all twenty-two Pacific Island nations than the partly shared 
history of British colonisation. 225   To increase its attractiveness and regional 
„clout‟, the SPF increased its scope to include all independent and self-governing 
countries as members. Perhaps a single regional organisation based only on 
British Commonwealth Pacific Island Countries could have existed alongside the 
SPC, but not one based on a membership that would include all Pacific Islands 
Countries as they became independent at some time in the future, as this would 
simply duplicate the SPC.226  However, recognition of overlaps and opportunities 
for the region did result in the Forum‟s successful establishment of the South 
Pacific Organisations Coordinating Committee (SPOCC) later known as the 
Council of Regional Organisations in the Pacific (CROP), in 1988 to manage 
relationships between the two, eliminating the need for a third organisation.227   
The issue of a single regional organisation was first discussed at the Forum in 
Canberra in 1972.  It was the same year the idea was floated to establish a 
Bureau in Fiji to organise matters of trade in the region.228  The Bureau became 
the South Pacific Economic Committee (SPEC) and eventually in 1988 became 
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known as the Forum Secretariat.229    In 1999 the members agreed to change 
the name to the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) which came into effect in 2000.230  
At Tarawa on 30 October 2000 the Agreement Establishing the Pacific Islands 
Forum Secretariat was opened for signature 231  and is still currently in force 
although it was reviewed in 2004 and a new agreement opened for signature in 
2005.  This agreement has been signed by all parties but at the time of writing 
was not ratified.232 
In 2005, PIFS contracted a review of the architecture for regional cooperation in 
the Pacific, again raising the desire of the Forum to instigate changes to 
established institutions in the region in pursuit of one single regional 
organisation. 233   The resulting fifty-four page report makes a total of nine 
recommendations, the final two of which would culminate in the merging of most 
regional institutions into one organisation, known as the Pacific Commission, 
under the joint supervision of PIFS and SPC.234  In 2006, the Forum agreed to 
establish a Taskforce to explore the issues and recommendations found in 
Hughes‟ 2005 report.235   The six-member Taskforce included individuals with 
backgrounds in economics, diplomatic postings, consultancy, and past directors 
of both the Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat and the Secretariat of the Pacific 
Community.236  This Taskforce analysed the previous report, consulted with all 
Pacific Island Countries and made a total of twenty recommendations.  The main 
recommendation concerned a change in regional institutional framework, and 
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instead of accepting Hughes‟ 2005 recommendation of one regional organisation 
under the supervision of PIF and SPC, it proposed a three pillar structure of a 
political pillar (PIF), a non political but technical pillar (Pacific Community and 
others), and an educational pillar (Fiji School of Medicine (FSch), Pacific Islands 
Development Program, East-West Center (PIDP) and University of the South 
Pacific (USP)).237  This model may suit the “Pacific Way” more appropriately than 
a single all-powerful organisation 238 , although a superficial glance at history 
suggests that the Metropolitan powers in the region have not given up their push 
for hegemony. The failure of persistent efforts by PIF to replace the SPC239 sends 
a clear message that legitimacy is not forthcoming. 
Once the new regional framework of the three pillars is implemented in 2010, if 
all parties come to agreement, organisations across the breadth of the Pacific 
Ocean will be in a position to concentrate on their core business.  The framework 
will provide a solid network for sharing information and knowledge across the 
spectrum of activities occurring in the region if the PIF and PIFS are able to 
relinquish their desire to actively manage and control the Pacific‟s architecture.   
The original functions of the Pacific Islands Forum were to focus on trade and 
related topics such as developing free trade arrangements, investigating the 
development plans of member countries, and exploring opportunities to develop 
transport in the region.  Ultimately, the Forum would gather all information and 
knowledge available on trade, production and economic development in and out 
of the region, to foster and develop the region‟s economy.  Other agenda items 
included Law of the Sea, Immigration, Civil Aviation, Telecommunications, 
Oceanic Resources, Shipping, Regional Cooperation and Education. 240   At the 
1972 forum a Regional Disaster Fund was approved and over twelve years would 
be built up to a total of $500,000241 with equal shares contributed by Australia, 
New Zealand and the Pacific Island members collectively.242 
The modern functions of the Forum and its secretariat reflect, to a degree, the 
original issues raised in the first agendas and appear in the 2007 revised Pacific 
Plan and the Corporate Plan 2005-2007. However, the Forum has increased its 
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areas of interest significantly which are now contained within four pillars - 
economic growth, sustainable development, good governance, and security 
encompassing a total of nine programmes.  The work generated by the 
programmes and priority areas seeks to meet the vision agreed by the Forum in 
April 2004.  The vision‟s overall philosophy is one of a region of „peace, 
harmony, security and economic prosperity, so that all its people can lead free 
and worthwhile lives‟.  It also acknowledges the cultural diversity of the region 
and seeks respect through the way the Forum endeavours to meet its goals, and 
recognises the need for wide-reaching partnerships to attain its vision.243 
The Forum has identified areas for regional cooperation and ensured 
mechanisms such as the Honiara Declaration (1992), the Aitutaki Declaration 
(1997), the Biketawa Declaration (2000) and the Nasonini Declaration (2002) 
are in place to facilitate such collaboration between regional organisations.  
These particular declarations give priority to law enforcement and regional 
security issues, identifying major risk areas and interconnecting elements for 
specialist dialogue.  Key regional stakeholders in the areas of law, policing, 
customs and immigration are identified and a model for communicating risks and 
solutions to the Forum is documented.244  From 2008 PILON, PICP, OCO and 
PIDC meet at the Forum Secretariat offices every two months and the results of 
these meetings are reported to the Forum Regional Security Committee (FRSC). 
The Pacific Plan originated in 2005 and was revised in 2007.  It is the result of a 
number of issues being identified that impact on the Pacific peoples‟ wealth and 
way of life. The Pacific Plan is arranged around the same four pillars as appear in 
the Corporate Plan but covers a ten-year period although it is described as a 
living document, giving it flexibility to prioritise or include emerging situations 
that require attention.  The initiatives are further prioritised for action, that is, 
implementation, agreement in principle, or, further analysis required.245   
The Pacific Islands Forum does not have any formal rules which regulate the way 
its meetings are held or conducted. Consensus, otherwise known as the Pacific 
Way, is the method of agreement for decisions on issues raised on the agenda.  
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The agenda is the mechanism for the secretariat and other regional reports to 
the Forum.  Other agenda items can be raised by members as they wish. 
Representatives of each of the Forum member governments make up the Forum 
Officials Committee (FOC) and this body is responsible for the governance and 
oversight of the PIFS.246  
Collaboration and dialogue with partners external to the Forum takes place at 
ministerial level following the annual Forum.247  In 2006 this arrangement was 
reviewed to ensure that all members kept appropriate relationships with their 
external partners.248 
The Secretary-General of PIFS permanently chairs the Council of Regional 
Organisations in the Pacific (CROP)249 which again implies that PIFS controls the 
consultative power in the region and particularly over the Pacific Community and 
its Secretariat.    
The Secretariat acted for Pacific Island Countries Trade Agreement (PICTA)250 
Rules of Origin Committee (ROC) 251  and as a partner to New Zealand and 
Australian Customs organisations in developing South Pacific Regional Trade and 
Economic Co-operation Agreement (SPARTECA) Rules of Origin.252   
The Forum also established the Forum Fisheries Agency to deal with all fishing 
matters; the Forum Regional Security Council (FRSC) to deal with all security 
matters; and the Law Enforcement Unit (LEU) to coordinate efforts by police, 
customs and immigration institutions in the region. 
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The PIFS annual budget for 2008 was split between three funds: the general 
fund for contributions from members, the trust fund for donations, and the 
reserve fund, which is generated from interest earned.  The overall budget of 
FJ$24,984,642 is split between these accounts.  Member and donor contributions 
are set out in a table expressing the amounts paid to the general and trust 
funds.  As the reserve fund of FJ$5,225 is generated from interest earned, it is 
not included in the table. [See Figure 2]  
Figure 2 – PIF Contributors and Donors253 
Contributors and Donors General Fund in FJ$ Trust Fund in FJ$ 
Australia 1,302,809 4,798,770 
Cook Islands 35,403  
FSM 69,536  
Fiji 78,519  
French Polynesia (Assoc) 15,500  
Kiribati 35,403  
Nauru 35,403  
New Caledonia (Assoc) 15,500  
New Zealand 1,302,809 4,205,147 
Niue 35,403  
Papua New Guinea 192,341  
Palau 35,403  
Republic of Marshall Islands 35,403  
Samoa 69,536  
Solomon Islands 69,536  
Tonga 69,536  
Tuvalu 35,403  
Vanuatu 69,536  
Japan  348,068 
Japan DCF254  696,403 
European Union  4,283,387 
United States of America  -255 
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Contributors and Donors General Fund in FJ$ Trust Fund in FJ$ 
UNDP/ESCAP/UNODC  446,641 
Asian Development Bank  114,776 
Great Britain  30,000 
Taiwan  649,169 
Commonwealth Secretariat  263,644 
Korea  640,127 
People‟s Republic of China  924,110 
World Trade Organisation  262,473 
Others  549,936 
Pacific Islands Law Officers’ Network (PILON) 
The Pacific Islands Law Officers‟ Network was previously known as the Pacific 
Islands Law Officers‟ Meeting (PILOM).  It was first established in 1980 and 
provided a forum for law officers to discuss legal and justice matters as they 
related to the region.256  However, in 2005 it was noted by the Attorney-General 
of Samoa that the annual meetings did not go any further than discussion 
between members, and that there was no communication between members 
from one meeting to the next.  It was also pointed out that there was no 
coordination of the information that came from PILOM or the Pacific Islands 
Chiefs of Police (PICP).257  Each organisation was similarly concerned about the 
effects of transnational crime and terrorism, creating a natural partnership in 
progressing legal, judicial and policing processes.   The 25th PILOM agreed that 
PIFS would be an appropriate agency to carry out a review of their 
organisation.258   
The review made several recommendations including a commitment to table a 
report at the Forum Regional Security Committee Meeting and to change its 
meeting structure to focus on key regional legal issues rather than presenting 
country papers, on producing an outcomes paper from meetings, and to consider 
the possibility of a Pacific Law Ministers Meeting from 2008.  Recommendations 
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were also made for the establishment of a secretariat to carry workloads and 
coordinate events between and for annual meetings.259 
Many of the recommendations were accepted by PILOM, which also went a step 
further in changing its name to better reflect their focus on sharing 
information. 260   The organisation also works closely with PIFS on various 
elements of the Pacific Plan. Its secretariat is currently housed in Fiji, funded by 
the Australian Government‟s Attorney-General‟s Office and continued as such 
until at least the 2008 PILON meeting261 at an annual cost of approximately 
FJ$160,000.262  
Oceania Customs Organisation (OCO) 
The Oceania Customs Organisation (OCO) was originally established as Customs 
Heads of Administration Regional Meeting (CHARM) in 1986 to improve 
communication between customs organisations throughout the region by 
communicating more effectively and also to simplify and harmonise 
procedures.263  Key focus areas for OCO to action at 2006 were: trade facilitation 
and revenue collection, law enforcement and security, human resource 
development in relation to modernisation and capacity building, and 
communication and representation.  The Secretariat is now co-located in the 
Pacific Community‟s Fiji office compound in Suva, albeit as a stand-alone 
organisation.264 
The OCO has representation of customs administrations from twenty-three 
member countries within an area defined by the territorial boundaries of 
Melanesia, Micronesia, Polynesia and Australasia.  They meet at Conference 
annually.  All members fund an operational budget which ensures representation 
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by members at conference.  A tier structure for payment has been introduced in 
acknowledgement of the disparity in economies across the region.  The OCO has 
an annual budget provided by the New Zealand government to run the 
secretariat and pay salaries, and New Zealand Customs provides a salary for the 
Head of the Secretariat.265 
Pacific Islands Association of Non-government 
Organisations (PIANGO) 
PIANGO as its name suggests is a civil society network of National Liaison Units 
(NLUs) in twenty-one Pacific Island Countries and territories.  Established in 
1991, its primary role is to act as a channel for NGOs and to strengthen their 
influence and impact in the Pacific.  Its four key focus areas are Sharing 
Information, Building Capacity, Strengthening Key Relationships and Ensuring 
Quality Performance.266  It has attained formal recognition by PIFS which gives it 
access to some PIFS meetings, and is striving for accreditation of PIFS, the 
United Nations and the European Union.267 
PIFS attends PIANGO‟s planning, implementation, monitoring, evaluation and 
reporting (PIMER) meeting, along with resource personnel from NZAID, the 
International Centre for Not-for-Profit Law (ICNL), AUSAID Pacific Leadership 
Programme and the European Union (EU), to „guide and mainstream the 
direction of the year‟s review and appraisal process‟.  This process demonstrates 
a high level of transparency and accountability for PIANGO and collaboration at a 
number of levels for strategies involving the region.268 
PIANGO is supported by NZAID, Commonwealth Foundation, AusAID, UNDP 
Pacific Centre, Canadian International Development Agency, PIFS, the 
Development Resource Centre269, Australian Volunteers International and CCFD.  
The organisation has a budget of approximately FJ$260,000.270 
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Pacific Immigration Directors’ Conference (PIDC) 
The first Conference of the Immigration Directors was sponsored by and held at 
the Forum Secretariat in Suva, Fiji Islands in 1996.  Directors from across the 
region agreed on the importance of meeting together to share information and 
discuss issues that affect the lives of citizens through the policies and actions of 
immigration departments.  They saw the importance of collaboration with other 
organisations where overlaps in interests occur, specifically the PICP, OCO, 
PILON, Interpol and others.  The PIDC has been supported by a permanent 
secretariat since 2002 and for most of that year was co-located with the OCO in 
Brisbane offices.  However, the OCO moved its secretariat to Noumea in 
November of the same year, creating a dilemma for the PIDC Secretariat.  This 
was solved by negotiating with the Forum Secretariat, and from December 2002 
the PIDC Secretariat has been co-located at the Forum Secretariat offices in 
Suva, Fiji.271  
In 2005, the PIDC recognised the changing landscape and reviewed its structure, 
direction and membership.  The review resulted in new strategic and work plans, 
to facilitate continuing action between conferences, and establish a Policy 
Advisory Group.272 
Activities of the group include comparative analysis of legislation covering 
immigration in member countries, work on secure information communication 
systems, integrity, institutional strengthening and a range of specific issues 
relating to immigration and the movement of people and commodities.273  Key 
focus areas cover cooperation, implementation of regional policies, the exchange 
of technical assistance, and collaboration with other regional and international 
bodies.  Membership is open to twenty-three Pacific Island Countries and 
territories including Australia and New Zealand.274 
The PIDC and PIDC Secretariat receive funds from New Zealand and Australia to 
cover administration running costs and salaries of the Head of the Secretariat, 
an administration assistant, a research officer and a seconded analyst.   
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Pacific Regional Policing Initiative (PRPI)  
The establishment of the PRPI was announced in 2002 as a five-year 
collaborative response by Australia, New Zealand and Fiji following the terrorist 
attack on New York‟s World Trade Centre Towers in 2001 and a growing concern 
about transnational crime.  Because policing in the region was considered by 
some275 as naïve, the purpose of the PRPI was to build the domestic policing 
capacity of individual police services which would increase the ability of local 
jurisdictions to recognise the more sophisticated offending peculiar to 
transnational crime.  The PRPI developed training packages targeted at raising 
the competency of basic policing methods and delivered them to PIF countries.  
At the end of 2008, the PRPI was reviewed resulting in a change of name to the 
Pacific Policing Development Programme (PPDP) and the project shedding its 
previous partners with the AFP taking control of the new initiative as well as 
providing all funds for its programmes.276  
Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict 
(GPPAC), Pacific People Building Peace (PPBP) 
Included in this section is the Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed 
Conflict (GPPAC) or as they are better known in the Pacific, Pacific People 
Building Peace (PPBP). This, like PIANGO, is a non-government organisation 
working across the Pacific including Bougainville, the Cook Islands, Fiji, Kiribati, 
Samoa, the Solomon Islands, Papua New Guinea, West Papua, Tonga, Tuvalu, 
Australia and New Zealand.277  The organisation was established in 2003 and 
aims to „build a new international consensus on peace building and the 
prevention of violent conflict‟.  Fifteen regions around the world have set their 
own action agenda which contribute to the global action agenda based on tasks 
targeted to national, regional and international levels. 278   Listed as GPPAC 
partners in the Pacific are: the Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat (PIFS), and the 
United Nations Development programme Pacific-Centre (UNDP-PC). 279   This 
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organisation forms an important link between civil society, security and law 
enforcement in the region. 
Pacific Transnational Crime Coordination Centre (PTCCC) 
Since 2003 the PICP has unanimously supported the establishment of the Pacific 
Transnational Crime Coordination Centre (PTCCC) to manage matters of 
intelligence in relation to transnational crime.  Provided by the Australian Federal 
Police (AFP) the PTCCC opened its first office in Suva, Fiji on 15 June 2004 and 
moved to Apia, Samoa in June 2008 to avoid deteriorating relationships resulting 
from the 2006 military coup.280 
Others 
There are two other main international and regional organisations working in the 
Pacific with which security and law enforcement agencies have a peripheral 
relationship; as such, they need to be identified.   
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) 
The first is Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), which includes Australia 
and New Zealand as members but none of Pacific Island Countries.  The group is 
primarily a forum to reduce barriers to economic and trade activities between its 
members.  It is given space in this thesis simply for the reason that prosperous 
economies rely on societies that are peaceful and lawful and APEC is a 
potentially beneficial relationship for the emerging and developing economies 
throughout the region.   
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and ASEAN 
Regional Forum (ARF) 
The second is Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and ASEAN 
Regional Forum (ARF).  The dialogue partners of ASEAN include Australia, Japan, 
New Zealand, Canada, the European Union, the United States, the People‟s 
Republic of China, India, the Republic of Korea, Russia and the United Nations 
Development Programme.  These partners almost mirror the Pacific Islands 
Forum‟s Dialogue partners and it seems Pacific Islands Forum ministers attend 
this round of discussions annually immediately following the PIF.   
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ARF is the regional security arm of ASEAN and was created by ASEAN and its 
dialogue partners in 1992 as a „move towards a higher plane of political and 
economic cooperation to secure regional peace and prosperity‟.281  The two major 
goals of ARF place expectations and responsibility on participants to encourage 
useful and beneficial communication about matters of security and matters of 
concern, and to be active in building confidence and preventative diplomacy in 
the region.  Whilst only one of the Pacific Islands Countries (PNG) has direct 
input into this forum, about two-thirds of them have collective representation 
through the Pacific Islands Forum.282 
Sub-regional bodies 
In addition to the regional organisations, Chiefs of Police meet sub-regionally in 
Micronesia, Melanesia and Australasia.  The Australasian conference in 2006 had 
representation from Hong Kong, New Zealand, Singapore, Papua New Guinea, 
Tonga, and all the Australian state, territorial and federal police.  Discussion 
topics focused on community safety, common police arrangements, crime, 
mental health, security, and integrity.283 
Cooperation and Collaboration 
Communication 
As can be seen by the Pacific Islands regional organisations highlighted in the 
first part of this chapter, there is a good deal of cooperation going on in the 
Pacific.  All of these groups have formed a cooperative liaison because their 
interests bind them together and common threads run through their 
constitutions and corporate plans.  Many describe their key focus areas as 
pillars, implying structures of support.  Evident in most plans is particular 
reference to the need for communication within their own agencies in addition to 
communicating with other agencies and organisations.  These groups are 
working well within their own spheres but a need to coordinate efforts has been 
identified to ensure that overlaps in programmes and services do not occur.  
Coordination could be achieved by one group assuming the mantle of 
overarching coordinator, or it could be achieved by taking the task to a topic 
specific level as presented in the three pillar structure, spreading the 
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responsibility over a number of personnel or organisations.  Linking activities 
between pillars would become a collaborative exercise.  The coordination 
provided currently by PIFS contributes to perceptions of a power imbalance.  
Many research participants discussed the need for greater communication and 
perhaps better planning between agencies.  As one interviewee explained: 
For example, I‟m in Samoa today, I find out last week just before I leave 
that AusAID are coming through to do a review of the AusAID projects in 
[my country] and I‟m in Samoa and the lady that was here has just 
left.284 
That the two key personnel in each agency were in the same country but did not 
cross paths indicates a severe lack of communication.  Another participant also 
commented on a need for good communication within and across their own 
government structures:  
We need to be heard and it‟s our responsibility as the head of police or 
law enforcement to make sure that our leaders understand the problems.  
They cannot help when they don‟t know.285    
Traditionally, police have been the „poor cousin‟ in government and as 
such have received less from government coffers than health and 
education.286   
The links between health, education, employment and crime and disorder have 
been well documented.  It is essential for all of these agencies to work together 
and for all of their ministers to be aware of the links and how they contribute to 
a safe and peaceful society which itself contributes to economic prosperity. 
In 1991 the Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat (PIFS) presented a paper: Regional 
law Enforcement Co-operation – The Challenge to the South Pacific Chiefs of 
Police Conference.  The report acknowledges law enforcement as a recent focus 
for PIFS, seemingly instigated by the Commonwealth Secretariat in response to 
concerns about terrorism and hi-jacking in the region.  Issues around legal 
matters, extraditions, and capacity to respond to such matters were raised.  
Finding solutions to these problems requires close and regular contact between 
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agencies and organisations involved in law enforcement and border security.287  
While each of the agencies involved in law enforcement and judicial matters 
have been working on solutions in isolation, the essential collaboration between 
them has taken seventeen years to come to fruition.  As of 2008, the Executive 
Directors of the PILON, PICP-S, OCO and PIDC meet every two months in Suva 
at PIFS to discuss law enforcement matters. 288   A report of the meeting is 
presented to the FRSC which then has the responsibility of taking pressing 
matters to the Forum.  This process of communication addresses regional 
cooperation for a number of organisations and ultimately, the Pacific Plan. 
Perceptions of Power 
Whilst the PIF and PIFS have taken on a leadership role largely driven by 
Australia and to an only slightly lesser degree New Zealand, there are 
perceptions of a power mismatch between the two metropolitan states and the 
Pacific Way.  Some research interviewees keenly felt the disadvantage of 
working and living in developing countries and being reliant on wealthy countries 
to support them.  For example: 
[…] Because they are taking the lead, the policy role; because they have 
more experience and expertise in combating issues at a national level 
and transnational issues; because of that and including other variables 
we smaller island countries are a weak attempt on them.  Not only from 
an economical point of view but as well as other variables […] and in that 
sense they take more power than us.  They decide what they can show 
us.  What they want us to do, in accordance with their political aspect. 
[…]289 
Other interviewees talked of a genuine desire by Australia and New Zealand to 
help the people of the Pacific Islands rather than being politically motivated, and 
still others were more pragmatic, acknowledging needs-based donations were 
essential for success:   
Donor countries particularly want to sprint things forward.  But ultimately 
aid is going to fail if it is not provided in such a way that the recipient 
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countries can make use of it and capitalise on it.  Otherwise it‟s just 
money down the gurgler.290 
But other respondents saw a conflict for the AFP and NZP.  A vested interest in 
the future of policing in the Pacific through donor and training provider roles 
does not sit well alongside decision making roles as members of the PICP.  A 
number of respondents saw a solution to this through a more assertive role for 
the Pacific Islands Chiefs of Police and a more involved role for their Secretariat:   
Ownership of policing standards and aid initiatives need to be seized by 
Pacific Islands‟ members of PICP to develop their own process, not to be 
dictated to by donor countries.  This requires good practice and ownership 
which requires strong leadership – it is crucial for the Pacific Islands 
members to take control of their own processes.  The Pacific Islands‟ 
chiefs need to lead while other members should sit outside as supporters.  
PICP-S has a crucial role to play, to be an action body in taking objective 
coordination of this process.291 
Advisory roles for AFP and NZP rather than membership would reduce this 
conflict and return the power of destiny to the Pacific. 
Language 
Cooperation and collaboration are as much about language as actions.  
Organisational plans provide an insight into where an organisation sees itself in 
the present and future and the barriers or pathways to acceptance, discussion 
and cooperation.  For example, the Fourteenth Pacific Islands Forum 
Communiqué included a section on a „Single Regional Organisation (iii)‟, stating 
that in order for such an organisation [SRO] to be successful it should „recognise 
the position of the Forum as the supreme authority on issues of regional 
concern‟.  Current Forum literature describes itself as „the region‟s premier 
political and economic policy organisation‟.292   Whilst the language has been 
somewhat tempered, there remains an air of superiority.  One interviewee was 
aware of the effects of language on Pacific Island peoples:  
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It‟s been my belief, and this has been driven by a government through 
some need, identified need, then we‟re probably better to advise softer 
rather than through a body perhaps like the forum.293 
The Pacific Way 
The Pacific Community and the Secretariat of the Pacific Community (SPC) has 
been described by its review team as a „quiet achiever‟ that should take more of 
a leadership role in the region.294  The apolitical nature of the Pacific Community, 
its membership of twenty-two Pacific Island Countries plus four metropolitan 
states 295  and its organisational structure and format ensure wide coverage, 
acceptance and respect of the large majority of all Pacific Island Countries.  The 
SPC literature and philosophy is „people-centric‟ where development in three 
main pillars is a means of improving the life of Pacific Island peoples.     
The Tyranny of Distance 
It became apparent during the research interviews that the diversity of the 
region and time between flights to and out of some countries had a bearing on 
how much collaboration was undertaken.  As one respondent put it:  
You can‟t get off the place.  So, not everybody‟s got a week to spare for 
a two-day meeting.296 
Such isolation requires careful assessment of the costs and benefits associated 
with the demands of cooperation.  Most regional meetings are run by a chair 
designated by the meeting‟s host country and this role rotates to share the 
burden of cost and time.  To take into account the time required to meet in 
isolated locations more than one conference could be held around the same time 
as well as cross-agency dialogue, but the gains of holding larger meetings in 
isolated locations are offset by a shortage in the infrastructure required for such 
an influx of people.   Likewise, when regional meetings are held offsite, the value 
of additional time away from the workplace over and above that required for one 
meeting needs to be weighed up against the value of cooperation.  Overcoming 
this type of isolation needs region-wide planning and committed individuals 
active in pursuing the benefits of cooperation; otherwise, it may be simpler for 
some very small countries to withdraw from building a regional and global 
society.   
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Summary 
Organisations with a range of objectives, but specifically directed at improving 
the lives of Pacific Island peoples through developing safe, healthy, secure and 
prosperous societies have been discussed in this chapter.  Corporate and action 
plans reflect the importance of the ocean as the region‟s premier resource for 
well-being and wealth alongside issues of the environment, capacity, good 
governance, regional security and law and order.  Regional groups of relevance 
include the Pacific Community, the Pacific Islands Chiefs of Police and their 
Secretariat, the Pacific Islands Forum and its Secretariat, the Pacific Islands Law 
Officers‟ Network, Oceania Customs Organisation, Pacific Islands Association of 
Non-government Organisations, Pacific Immigration Directors‟ Conference, 
Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict, Asia-Pacific Economic 
Cooperation, ASEAN and ASEAN Regional Forum, and sub-regional bodies. 
Australia and New Zealand have a stake in all regional organisations in various 
roles but there is a difference in the way each country works in the Pacific.  
Australia has, in the past, looked to New Zealand to support its political moves, 
particularly immediately following the Second World War in its instigation to 
establish the South Pacific Commission, and more recently in its endeavour to 
establish a single regional organisation through the establishment of the South 
Pacific Forum.297  The deliberate removal of the political function, included in the 
ANZAC Pact but not the establishing documents of the SPC, resulted from the 
colonial power base of the participating governments and a lack of foresight, 
along with the refusal, particularly by the US and France, to relinquish the power 
of colonialism.  Had the SPC relinquished this power in 1964 when several 
amendments were made along with a partial loosening of the colonial reins, and 
included political development as originally mooted in the ANZAC Pact (1944), 
there would have been no need for a second regional institution in the form of 
the South Pacific Forum.  And therefore, no drive for a Single Regional 
Organisation from the SPF and no mention of further ambition to establish such 
an organisation in the PIF Pacific Plan‟s update.  
Interviewees discussed the need for good communication within their own 
organisations as well as with other government agencies and across the region 
and a need for better planning.  The need for coordination of regional activities is 
recognised, but how that should take form is problematic.  Australia in particular, 
and to a lesser extent New Zealand, continue to exert pressure through the PIF 
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for the establishment of a three pillar structure for the Pacific in 2010, which 
would ultimately encompass all regional organisations.  Some organisations have 
co-located themselves with PIFS or with the SPC and this arrangement can work 
well, particularly if there is no pressure or assumption of ownership or 
management of these groups by PIFS.  There are perceptions that the wealthy 
countries use the power of the dollar to pursue their own goals in the region, and 
that this attitude needs to be tempered for just and sustainable development to 
occur.  Attitudes towards and acceptability of cooperative regional policing can 
be affected by the use of language which can suggest either superiority or 
inclusion.  Discussion with research participants also raised issues concerning the 
tyranny of distance and isolation.  For all members of the Pacific to feel 
meaningfully involved in such regional arrangements, careful planning through 
good communication is essential especially when flights are infrequent and 
infrastructure is minimal.  
Whilst coordination and cooperation between agencies, institutions, and civil 
society are critical in developing the Pacific, more speed can be gathered by 
gaining true legitimacy from diverse populations, cultures and societies through 
seeking to truly understand and respect their needs, history, language and 
culture.  Indeed, ways must be found of overcoming obstacles to enhanced 
regional cooperation through real empowerment of Pacific peoples.  Their voices 
must be heard, respected, and given due weight and perhaps even paramountcy 
in whatever regional architecture is established. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: Recommendations and 
Conclusions 
The Pacific region is vast and populated by only small numbers representing 
hundreds of cultures across thousands of islands.  Policing in this region is 
complex and arguably an essential element of economic advancement.  Policing 
should be included in all development strategies because just and sustainable 
economic growth and development cannot occur in unsafe or insecure 
communities.  Policing in PICs is affected by a range of external elements 
ranging from models of governance and policing left over from colonial days that 
are inappropriate and expensive to maintain, to the effects of globalisation and 
regionalism, and to the agenda of wealthy donors intent on rushing change and 
modernisation or erecting monuments to their generosity.  The small populations 
of PICs have been jolted into a globalising world by such external forces as: the 
sudden exit of some colonial rulers, prompting Pacific populations and 
governments to re-establish their own identities; an increasing number of 
tourists in the region who display their disposable incomes to the vulnerable 
eyes of the Pacific; increased numbers of migrants taking up residence as a 
result of politically motivated agreements between states resulting in a greater 
incidence of organised crime.  Along with this explosion of change has come the 
categorisation of developing countries for the large majority PICs and an 
opportunity for wealthy countries to parade their international leadership by 
pouring extensive financial resources into the region under the guise of 
development. 
My research has identified four main issues arising from these elements that 
affect international policing in the Pacific.  The first is a lack of consideration of 
cultural needs and customs.  The second is an asymmetrical balance of power 
weighted towards Australia and to a lesser degree, New Zealand.  The third is 
the way outsiders engage with local communities in the Pacific.  The fourth is 
aid.  All of these are discussed more fully along with recommendations for 
change that are designed to fully include the voices of the Pacific as creators of 
their own destiny while also recognising donor countries‟ security needs.  
Consideration of Culture and Custom 
The need to develop appropriate cultural models by including local people was 
first documented in the ANZAC Pact in 1944 and is discussed in this thesis on 
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p.52.  But according to my interviewees, by far the biggest underlying concern 
was the metropolitan countries‟ lack of consideration of cultural needs and 
customs when working in the Pacific.  These are often opposed to western ways 
of doing things but form the heart of Pacific Island‟s life and rule of law.  Pacific 
life is centred on familial ties and as such civil society forms an integral part of 
social control.  Interviewees universally agreed there was no going back to pre-
colonial lifestyles and rules, but that any work carried out on their homeland had 
to be done in a way that took into consideration their customary ways of doing 
things.  Participants saw these as more appropriate, workable, understandable 
and sustainable than western ways.  However, to ensure modifications to models 
of government and the rule of law reflect such practices, it is essential that 
decision makers in the Pacific accept the responsibility of making sure their own 
voices are heard.  The following recommendations apply to both those involved 
specifically in strengthening policing in the Pacific and more generally to efforts 
at enhancing regional cooperation. 
Recommendations 
1. International staff are exposed to „the heart of the country‟, learning 
about the local economy, legal system, customs and institutions 
(including civil society, non-government agencies and government 
agencies) so they more fully understand the country‟s needs before 
building collegial working relationships with citizens of their host country. 
2. International agencies let the host country take the lead in whole-of-
government capacity building exercises, and confine themselves to 
offering support and expert advice on request. 
3. Local Pacific staff make their voices heard within their own government 
and at regional meetings. 
The Balance of Power 
Since modernity, the peoples of the Pacific Island Countries have been witness to 
a shift in the locus of power.  The preponderance of power has been taken from 
them, first through colonisation and then decolonisation, then by globalisation 
and regionalisation, and more recently because of a fear of national and regional 
insecurity.  Although regionalisation suggests a more intimate relationship 
between partners than the idea of globalisation, the Pacific as a region faces 
many challenges from much larger players on the global stage.  The Pacific 
regional architecture reflects the importance of the rise of China and Japan as 
new world powers.  However, the focus is on Asia and other large world 
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players298 while none of the nation-states of the Pacific Ocean are identified for 
economic, community-building, national security, or political consideration.  The 
discourse on building and improving Pacific architecture,299 whilst broad in its 
reach, fails miserably to include the voices of those at its very core.  Papua New 
Guinea is the only member of APEC that is also part of the region discussed in 
this thesis.  This is curious as the twenty-six island countries are positioned in 
the direct path of east-west and north-south transportation highways.  
Furthermore, the ocean in which they lie and resources they have ownership 
over contain a bounty all of those large players vie for.  Additionally, the Pacific 
Islands Forum, a regional body that includes many of the states in its name, also 
fails, by its own admission, to properly address their cultural needs.  In the 
Pacific the current balance of power is firmly seated with Australia and New 
Zealand, but this balance is shifting with new and bigger players acting on the 
Pacific stage.   
The first element that contributes to the nature of the unequal relationship is the 
way political actors employ language.  This was seen by discourse in Australian 
policy and elsewhere and can be compared with that of the Pacific Community to 
gain an insight into how the balance of power is maintained.  The former uses 
language implying superiority over the region while the latter‟s language is 
people centric and inclusive.  While Australia maintains the mantle of regional 
hegemon, the Pacific Community enjoys the loyalty of Pacific peoples.300   
The second element in maintaining the balance of power is wealth.  Australia and 
New Zealand have provided resources to the Pacific region as a whole for a very 
long time.  They have also supplied financial resources and training to Pacific 
policing from the late 1970s through their involvement in the PICP and more 
recently through more sophisticated bi-lateral agreements.  The Chiefs of Police 
are keenly aware of the asymmetric advantages these donations of time, 
experience, expertise and finance present.    
Interviewees said that Australia and New Zealand work in different ways.  
Australia appears as the mighty and powerful fistful of dollars, while New 
Zealand works alongside the people of the Pacific. I acknowledge, as did the 
interviewees, that both Australia and New Zealand genuinely want to advance 
development in the Pacific, including policing, but better and more collegial 
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outcomes will result faster by changing to an inclusive approach.  No country 
enjoys being labelled a failing or failed state, and as pointed out in the literature, 
these labels assume that something is broken.  All metropolitan countries must 
remember and remind themselves that, as developing states, the Pacific Island 
Countries do not have the benefit of over a hundred years of independence or 
the resources to bounce onto the world economic stage.  Expectations of instant 
globalisation are unrealistic. 
Unequal power breeds resentment and that, in turn, frustrates western ideas of 
progress which typically want to „sprint things along‟.  It must be local 
partnerships that form the strength and focus of any reform, not the decisions 
of, or beneficial „payoffs‟ for, powerful resource providers.   
Recommendations 
4. Australia in particular uses more people centric language, as in Pacific 
Community documentation.  This includes the Australian government, PIF 
and AFP discourse. 
5. Australia and New Zealand both consider the stage of development of 
Pacific Island Countries and slow their own „sprint‟ to a more acceptable 
„jog‟ to be more inclusive of all participants. 
Methods of Engagement  
There are a number of organisations in the Pacific involved in getting things done 
for and in the region.  Pacific governmental architecture in 2009 is hotchpotch 
and dysfunctional.  Australia and New Zealand are engaged in a sibling spat with 
each emphasising their own successes and ways of doing things as being better 
than the other.  This occurs at PIFS and the PICP where the former says their 
smaller membership is not important while the latter says their larger 
membership is important.  What is really important for these two actors to grasp 
is that kinship is the basis of life in the Pacific and therefore the methods of 
engagement are extremely important to establish acceptability and 
sustainability.  Even though PIF has a smaller membership, and is therefore 
more limited in its reach than the PICP, there is a place for both organisations.  
But communication between all regional groups is essential.  CROP is a very 
good effort at regional cooperation and co-ordination, but is hampered in 
acceptance by the insistence of permanent chairmanship by PIFS.   
As discussed in Chapter Three, the PICP and its secretariat, the PICP-S, are 
beset by similar bickering causing diversions from the work that needs to be 
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done on policing in the region.  The Chiefs acknowledge their need for outside 
assistance and are thirsty for knowledge, but the countries capable of providing 
both of these tools need to recognise the wider picture and their own limitations.  
For instance, the AFP reportedly represents all Australian police services at the 
PICP, but again, the language used in their discourse paints a different picture.  
One example is that while all other members of the PICP express their 
membership in the name of their country, the AFP expresses its membership in 
the use of its organisational name.  Another example is, when asked for 
numbers about how many police members the AFP represents at the PICP, I was 
only given the numbers of AFP staff, not the entire country‟s numbers.  
Additionally, the AFP‟s predominant role is in security and intelligence while the 
state and territory police are more involved in day-to-day domestic policing 
which is more akin to the policing methods used and required in Pacific 
jurisdictions, although, because of the Pacific‟s positioning in transnational 
pathways, both skills are needed.  While New Zealand provides a domestic view, 
it is only one view from more advanced police services. 
There is a very important place for the PICP and its secretariat as the premier 
policing organisation for the region.  However, a number of issues stand in the 
way of this happening.   
The first is the balance of power, already identified as being weighted towards 
Australia and New Zealand.  During the late 1990s and early 2000s most 
regional organisations underwent reviews to ensure their structures were strong 
and appropriate for the future.  All of these reviews were undertaken by review 
teams external to those organisations, with the exception of the PICP which has 
undergone numerous reviews over its life.  Most of the PICP reviews were 
instigated by the AFP and all were carried out by a review team made up of the 
AFP, NZP and, sometimes, an additional representative chosen from the 
remaining members.  Again, this indicates that the balance of power is skewed 
toward the two metropolitan countries.  Furthermore, the practice lacks 
transparency, and is even suggestive of bullying.    
The second issue is the Pacific Way.  Even though the PICP uses voting as a 
method of decision-making when agreement can‟t be reached, the Pacific Way is 
more powerful.  When the strength of the voices is evenly balanced consensus 
works well, but if two of the twenty-one PICP voices are stronger than the other 
nineteen, the latter nineteen will defer to the stronger two rather than cause 
embarrassment or appear ungrateful.  This results in the silencing of Pacific 
voices.    
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The third issue, and an important finding of the research, is a conflict of interest 
by Australia and New Zealand.  This conflict is created by their roles as members 
of the PICP while also being donors to policing initiatives in the region.  This 
impacts on the decision making ability of the rest of the PICP and also in the 
provision of staff for the secretariat.  New Zealand Police provides the Executive 
Director, his assistant and premises, while the AFP supplies two to three short 
term project officers sourced from the Pacific.  The AFP also provides a project 
management staffer within the PICP-S who is also expected to carry out the role 
of Senior Liaison Officer in New Zealand.  This position creates a conflict of 
interest and blurs the purposes of the roles.   
Recommendations 
6. The role of chair at CROP rotates among the representatives of the 
Council with every member taking their turn, including taking 
responsibility for documenting discussions. 
7. The Chiefs of Australian Federal Police and New Zealand Police resign 
their membership of the PICP, but retain advisory status to the Pacific 
Islands Chiefs of Police.   
8. Advisory positions to the PICP include members of the state and territory 
police services of Australia,301 the AFP, NZP, US Police, and French Police.   
9. All Pacific Islands Chiefs of Police accept their responsibilities of 
leadership and change „The Pacific Way‟ from one of deference to the 
wealthy and powerful, to one of leadership in decision making at the 
PICP.302   
10. The PICP and PICP-S are reviewed by an external review team ideally 
sourced from the widely accepted SPC. 
11. The review team should consider: 
a. Whether the Pacific Islands Chiefs of Police should become, and 
maintain a position as, the premier organisation for policing 
matters in the Pacific. 
                                         
301
 Only one additional Australian member should accompany the AFP member to ensure that the 
loud voices don‟t drown out the quiet. 
302
 The Chiefs-only day at conference could be the ideal forum for this while the main conference 
could consist of advisory presentations and discussion of previously identified issues. 
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b. Whether the PICP should register as a regional organisation giving 
it a legal basis. 
c. Whether the PICP-S should become an action body for objective 
coordination of a range of data to properly inform the Chiefs‟ 
decisions. 
d. Whether the PICP-S should seek staff with expert skills, 
particularly in the fields of research, assessment and evaluation 
and the understanding of the cultures and customs of the Pacific. 
e. Whether conflicts are created by donor members in providing 
funds and/or positions which compromise transparency and 
accountability. 
AID 
The Pacific Region receives a wealth of funds every year that are largely tagged 
as resources for „development‟, but policing in the region also receives significant 
donations from a number of countries including Australia, New Zealand, China, 
Japan, France, and Taiwan.  This assistance is given in different guises including 
the provision of funds, training programmes, buildings, advice, personnel, and 
other resources with a range of accountability needs.  Australia and New 
Zealand, as significant long-time donors in the region, make stringent 
monitoring demands on receivers whereas China, Japan and Taiwan have 
different and less obvious demands for the use of their donations.  As discussed 
in Chapter Three, the benefits of many donated funds return to their country of 
origin or become unsustainable in the long term.  Much of the assistance 
provided to policing in the Pacific is by way of training programmes and these 
are often too technically advanced for the police service receiving them and are 
therefore, also unsustainable.  Comments were made by respondents that it was 
easy to get big items like buildings, cars and advanced training but it was much 
harder to get the resources they really needed, such as pens, notebooks and 
other basic necessities. 
Recommendations 
12. Resource needs assessments are undertaken in partnership by PICP-S 
personnel and in-country police experts. 
13. Training needs assessments are undertaken in partnership by PICP-S 
personnel and in-country staff. 
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14. All resources and training needs are compatible with just and sustainable 
outcomes. 
Conclusions 
In sum, the Pacific is policed by men and women from a range of countries, all 
dedicated to protecting the safety and security of the people and their territories.  
I have argued that international actors in this role present their own ideas of 
western policing models as the answer to future models of policing.  However, 
such policing models often pass over the cultural needs of those they are trying 
to assist and create a rule of law that reflects western society rather that the 
communities of the Pacific.  I have made recommendations that address this 
issue including exposing international actors to the culture of the country to gain 
a full understanding of the country‟s needs.  This understanding is essential to 
enable local staff to fully engage with international staff and effect reform that is 
appropriate to their needs.  Committing to the people of the land in this way 
ensures transparency and accountability for international staff.  Additionally, my 
approach to policing in the Pacific offers logical steps and methods of 
engagement that ensure the voices of the Pacific are heard, respected and acted 
upon.  Furthermore, that Australia and New Zealand hold the balance of power 
also contributes to the argument that capacity building in the region reflects 
western policing models and removes the ability from local decision makers and 
staff to effect their own appropriate change.  I have suggested a change in the 
language used in political and policing literature to address these arguments and 
return confidence to the Pacific.   This imbalance of power has been created by 
the need to accept a wealth of funds from richer countries manifesting their 
international status and drawing attention to new international rules concerning 
human rights.  The result is a deluge of assistance across the full range of 
development.  I have recommended that needs assessments be carried out in-
country in partnership to ensure resources and training meet the needs of those 
receiving them.  Finally, I have made recommendations to address conflicts of 
interest in policing the region which will establish the PICP as premier decision 
makers for policing in the region, supported by a secretariat with expertise in 
research, assessment and evaluation skills. 
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APPENDIX ONE: An Approach to Policing in 
the Pacific 
Policing the Pacific for Community Safety
VALUES
The overarching principles of policing anywhere should be based on clear and agreed values and principles.  My approach to 
international, multinational and transnational policing in the Pacific acknowledges David H. Bayley’s concepts of building 
democratic policing as discussed in Chapter Two, pp.14,16, but shifts the focus from what the already democratic want to achieve, 
to the needs and approach required from those requesting international assistance.  Therefore, my approach incorporates Bayley’s 
principles but is based on values that increase the scope of responsibility for international staff to ensure the needs of Pacific 
Peoples are met.
Ethics & 
Integrity
Public Trust & 
Confidence
Rule of Law
Human Rights
Leadership & 
Partnership
Communication
Just & 
Sustainable 
Culture & 
Customs
Assessment & 
Analysis & 
Evaluation
Expertise,  
Knowledge & 
Understanding
PICP & PICP-S
Advisory & 
Partnership
PRINCIPLES
Open, honest and respectful discussion 
and dialogue is essential in all strategic, 
tactical and operational planning.  Just as 
verbalising is a part of communication, so is 
genuine and active listening and hearing.
Policing is successful when the public has 
enough trust in its police agency to approach 
them for help and when they have 
confidence that their request for assistance 
will be dealt with fairly and impartially.
High standards of honesty, transparency, 
accountability and work ethic in carrying out 
policing duties and challenging low standards 
and values in others.
The legitimate laws made by a lawful 
government and that all citizens, residents 
and visitors are expected to abide by.
The right to a life of dignity, justice 
and peace, and freedom of speech and belief, 
and freedom from want and fear are the basic 
and non-negotiable rights of all human beings.   
When applied to policing it means that police 
personnel must carry out their duties impartially 
to the rule of law and use only reasonable force, 
that is, only enough force to counter 
resistance that ends a criminal or
 violent event. 
Good leadership recognises and 
encourages strong, collegial and equal 
partnerships in ensuring successful 
implementation of visions.
Embedded in the basis of community safety are the values and 
principles that inform the policy of police services and 
accompany the men and women in their professional and 
personal roles wherever they are authorised to operationalise 
policing.
Metropolitan actors act as advisers 
when requested and let Pacific decision 
makers make their own decisions.  Collegial 
working relationships are the basis for 
working together.
Any resources provided by donors are 
assessed for compatibility with local cultures 
and customs and future sustainability by local 
peoples  ensured.
Needs analyses and assessment are carried 
out in respect of resources in kind and 
financial, capital expenditure and training in-
country.  Evaluations are made during and 
following fund provision.
International staff are willing to gather 
expertise, knowledge and full understanding 
of issues facing policing in the Pacific.
The PICP is the lead policing 
organisationin the region and its Chiefs the 
premier decision makers for policing matters.  
The PICP-S is an action body for objective 
coordination of a range of data.
International staff are immersed in the 
culture and customs of the host country to 
learn and understand.
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Community Policing and 
Reassurance. 
Intelligence-led Policing. 
Road Policing.
Criminal Investigations. 
General Duties  Response.
Leadership and Management.
Domestic Policing
Crime Prevention. 
Security Intelligence Service. 
Emergency Planning. 
Strategy, Policy, and Administration.
A country’s intelligence 
service charged with ensuring national security by exchanging  
information with internal and external sources.
Police, civil defence and 
emergency services ensure plans are updated and tested to ensure 
operational competence in emergencies including flood, fire, earthquake, 
volcanic eruptions, air crashes and terrorism..
Proactive policing to prevent crime through social and environmental 
factors..
Collection and analysis of information, the production and dissemination 
of a range of products to target specific crimes, criminals and 
commodities.
Partnerships between 
community members and police to solve crime problems and reassure the 
community by sharing information about things that happen in the 
community.
Specialist policing to enhance driver awareness and road safety.
Specialist investigation of crime.
Uniformed response to calls of service from the public.
 
 
  
97 
APPENDIX TWO: Populations & Police 
Numbers 
Figure 3 - Total Population and Police Numbers by PICP Member Country 
as at 2008 unless otherwise specified.303 
Country Population 
GDP 
Per 
Capita 
(GDPPC) 
in US $ 
Type of 
Govt 
Police 
Numbers 
American Samoa 57,496 $5,800 Territory of US 400 
Australia 20,600,856 37,300 
Federal 
Democracy 
56,452 
6,036  
(Federal police 
only)  
Cook Islands 21,750 9,100 
Self governing 
(NZ) 
120 
FSM 107,665 2,300 
Compact of 
Free Assn (US) 
392  
(Includes 
federal and 
state police)  
Fiji Islands 931,741 3,900 
Republic under 
military regime 
(At 2006) 2,640 
French Polynesia 283,019 17,500 
Overseas 
Territory of 
France 
* 
Guam 175,877 15,000 Territory of US 293 
Kiribati 110,356 3,600 Republic 300 
Republic of 
Marshall Islands 
63,174 2,900 
Compact of 
Free Assn (US) 
175 
 Nauru 13,770 5,000 Republic 102 
New Caledonia 224,824 15,000 
Overseas 
Territory of 
France 
430 
New Zealand 4,173,460 27,200 
Parliamentary 
Democracy 
10,884 
                                         
303
 Pacific Islands Chiefs of Police Secretariat, "5th PICP Women's Advisory Network Conference: 
Future Directions of Women in Pacific Policing"; "The World Factbook".  
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Country Population 
GDP 
Per 
Capita 
(GDPPC) 
in US $ 
Type of 
Govt 
Police 
Numbers 
Niue 1,444 5,800 
Self governing 
(NZ) 
16 
C/wealth of Nthn 
Marianna Islands 
86,616 12,500 
Commonwealth 
in union with 
US 
186 
Papua New 
Guinea 
5,931,769 2,100 
Constitutional 
Democracy 
4,732 
Palau 21,093 7,600 
Compact of 
Free Assn (US) 
162 
Samoa 217,083 5,400 
Parliamentary 
Democracy 
457 
Solomon Islands 581,318 1,900 
Parliamentary 
Democracy 
1,052 
Tonga 119,009 5,100 
Constitutional 
Monarchy 
(As at 2007) 
328 
Tuvalu 12,177 1,600 
Constitutional 
Monarchy with 
Parliamentary 
Democracy  
63 
Vanuatu 215,446 3,900 
Parliamentary 
Republic 
530 
Total 33,949,943 9,071  85,750 
Total less 
Australia 
13,349,087 7,660  23,262 
Total less 
Australia and 
New Zealand 
9,175,627 6,631  12,378 
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APPENDIX THREE: External AID & GDPPC  
Figure 4 - External States by Country, Population, GDP, Government 
Type and Aid304 
Country Population 
GDP Per 
Capita 
(GDPPC) 
in US $ 
Type of Govt 
AID to 
the 
Pacific 
Australia 20,600,856 37,300 
Federal 
Democracy 
A$872.5 
million 
(2007-
2008)305 
Plus A$80.1 
million for 
policing 
(2009)306 
China 1,338,612,968 6,500 Communist State 
Est 
US$100-
350 
million307 
European 
Union 
491,582,852 
34,100 
(7–78,000) 
Hybrid 
intergovernmental 
and supranational 
€392 
million 
(2007)308 
France 64,057,792 32,600 Republic Unknown 
Japan 127,078,679 34,500 
Parliament with 
Constitutional 
Monarchy 
US$415 
million 
(2007-
2009)309 
New 
Zealand 
4,173,460 27,200 
Parliamentary 
Democracy 
NZ$205.5 
million 
                                         
304
 "The World Factbook,"  
305
 The Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, "Appendix C: Australia's Overseas Aid Program 
Budget 2007-2008," in Australia's aid program in the Pacific: Joint Standing Committee on Foreign 
Affairs, Defence and Trade (Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia 2007). 
306
 Attorney-General's Department, "AFP Training for Overseas Policing," Australian Government: 
Attorney-General's Department, 
http://www.ag.gov.au/www/agd/agd.nsf/Page/Publications_Budgets_Budget2008_MediaReleases_AF
PTrainingforOverseasPolicing (accessed 24 February, 2009). 
307
 Zhang, "China and the emerging regional order in the South Pacific." 
308
 Wiepke H.E. van der Goot and Aldo H.E.  Dell'Ariccia, "The European Union in the Pacific: Its role, 
its relationships, its contribution," in The European Union in the Pacific (Wellington, New Zealand 
2008). 
309
 Zhang, "China and the emerging regional order in the South Pacific." 
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Country Population 
GDP Per 
Capita 
(GDPPC) 
in US $ 
Type of Govt 
AID to 
the 
Pacific 
(2007-
2008)310 
Taiwan 22,974,347 31,500 
Multi-party 
Democracy 
Unknown 
(in decline 
as One 
China 
policy 
becomes 
effective) 
 
                                         
310
 Melanie Heaphy, "Making a Difference in Our Own Region," July, 2008 2008 Wellington: NZAID 
(accessed 11 December 2008). 
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APPENDIX FOUR: Interview Schedule 
You have been involved in matters of policing in the Pacific and have gained a good understanding of 
how the region works.  Would you consider the following questions and discuss them with me? 
1. What organisation are you with and what is your role within that organisation?   
2. What is your understanding of the driving force that brought together the Chiefs of Fiji, 
Tonga, the British Solomon Islands (now Solomon Islands), New Hebrides (now Vanuatu), 
Gilbert & Ellice Islands (Kiribati & Tuvalu), and Nauru for the first Chiefs of Police 
Conference in 1970? 
The PICP grew significantly from just seven members in 1970 to twenty-eight in 1992 (this number 
included the Australian state police services) and back to twenty-one in 2001.   
3. In your opinion, has this regional focus on policing in the Pacific through the Conference 
been successful and/or useful?  In what way? 
Along with a growth in membership of the PICP there has also been growth in donations to Pacific 
Island Countries from the foreign affairs departments in Australia and New Zealand, and also from 
larger Pacific Rim Countries such as China, Taiwan, the US and also the European Union. 
4. Are there significant differences in the expectations between PICP member and non-member 
donor countries? If so, how do these differences impact on policing in the region?   
There are a number of regional government and non-government organisations working in law 
enforcement throughout the Pacific. 
5. In your opinion, how well do these groups work together in providing services in the area?   
6. Is there a need to strengthen relationships between NGOs and other groupings? 
PICP member countries are extremely diverse, in population size, culture and economic basis.   
7. How do different perceptions of power across the region impact on policing standards?  
What if anything could or should be done about this? 
8. In your opinion what is the most important factor impacting on policing in your country?  
And neighbourhood?  And region? 
Most Pacific Island Countries‟ government infrastructures are based on the systems of previous 
colonial powers.   
9. Since decolonisation have these structures been changed in any way to reflect the culture 
and traditions of your country?  How? 
10. If so, have previous colonial influences had a beneficial impact on policing in your country?  
Region? 
11. What is your vision for policing in the Pacific? 
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APPENDIX FIVE: Consent Form 
Research Project: "POLICING THE PACIFIC: MULTINATIONAL 
ARRANGEMENTS" 
Researcher:   Bronwin M BOSWELL 
    Tel: +64 4 4638027 
Tel: +64 027 5762200 
    Email: Bronwin.Boswell@vuw.ac.nz 
I, _____________________________________________________________ [print name] consent 
to participate in the research project titled “Policing the Pacific: Multinational Arrangements” 
The purpose of the research has been explained to me, and I have been given the opportunity to ask 
questions about the research and received satisfactory answers. 
I permit the researcher to digitally record my interview as part of this project. 
I understand that I have a choice about whether information gathered from me in the course of this 
research can be attributed to me by name and/or other identifying information; or, that I prefer that 
my name and any other identifying information remain confidential. In the case that I do wish this 
information to remain confidential I understand that neither my name nor any other identifying 
information will be used or published. 
I understand that Victoria University Wellington (VUW) Human Ethics Committee and New Zealand 
Police have approved this research. 
I understand that if I have any complaints or concerns about this research I can contact: 
Dr Allison Kirkman Dr Ray Goldstein 
Chair - Human Ethics Committee Victoria 
University Wellington (VUW) -  Kelburn Campus 
Senior Lecturer - Political Science & International 
Relations (VUW) - Kelburn Campus 
 Supervisor for Researcher 
Phone: 04 4635676   Phone: 04 4635796 
Email: Allison.Kirkman@vuw.ac.nz Email: Ray.Goldstein@vuw.ac.nz  
   
Signed by    ____________________________________ 
 
Name (Printed)___________________________________ 
 
Date ____________________________________ 
 
My name and any other identifying information are to remain confidential Yes   No 
I would like a synopsis of the thesis after grading is finalised   Yes   No 
